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The Creative Destruction of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology
Raymond Shih Ray Kut
To determine whether sharing music over peer-to-peer networks such as Napster should be
considered copyright infringement, we must first conclude that digital works are entitled to copy-
right protection. This Article argues against copyright protection for digital works because the eco-
nomics of digital technology undercuts prior assumptions about the efficacy of a private property
regime for information, a public good. Questioning the conventional wisdom that the two interests
served by copyright, creation and public dissemination, are aligned, the Article reveals that the ar-
gument for copyright is primarily an argument for protecting content distributors in a world in
which middlemen are obsolete Copyright is no longer needed to encourage distribution because
consumers themselves build and fund the distribution channels for digital content With respect to
the creation of music this Article argues that exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute copies
provide little if any incentive for creation, and that digital technology makes itpossible to compen-
sate artists without control
INTRODUCTION
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the
globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improve-
ment of his conditions, seems to have been peculiarly and benevo-
lently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expand-
able over all space, without lessening their density in any point,
and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical
being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.
Thomas Jefferson'
The combination of the Internet and digital technology presents
copyright law with what has been described as a digital dilemma.2 On
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The Complete Jefferson 1011,1015 (Duell, Sloan & Pearce 1943).
2 See Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and the Emerging Information Infra-
structure, National Research Council, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Informa-
tion Age (National Academy 2000) (describing as a "digital dilemma" the technical, legal, politi-
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one hand, digital technology makes it possible to make an unlimited
number of perfect copies of music, books, or videos in digital form,
and through the Internet individuals may distribute those digital
works around the world at the speed of light . As demonstrated by
Napster, the controversial peer-to-peer music-sharing network,4 this
combination makes it possible for users to share music and other
works without paying for them-thus depriving copyright holders of
revenue that they might otherwise have received if individuals pur-
chased those works in tangible form.5 On the other hand, when com-
bined with legal sanctions, digital technology also makes it possible to
control information to an unprecedented degree.6 Using encryption,
trusted systems, and digital watermarking technology, distributors of
digital works may not only preserve existing markets for their works,
but they may also create new markets. 7 Digital technology therefore
has "the potential to demolish a careful balancing of public good and
private interest that has emerged from the evolution of U.S. intellec-
tual property law over the past 200 years."8
As a result of the digital dilemma, we are in the midst of a great
debate over the proper scope of copyright in the twenty-first century.
At stake is the balance of power in the information age. On one side,
content providers such as artists, the entertainment industry, and self-
described copyright "optimists"9 argue that copyright law should be
extended and modified to allow copyright holders to control all distri-
bution and use of digital information.'° For example, Paul Goldstein
cal, economic, sociological and psychological issues relating to the advent of digital information,
computer networks, and the World Wide Web). See also Information Infrastructure Task Force,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights 178 (Sept 1995) ("White Paper"), available online at
<http://www.uspto.govlweb/offices/comldoc/ipniil> (visited Dec 23, 2001) (discussing balancing
the access needs of Internet users with the rights of owners to control access to their works).
3 See Part I.
4 Napster was "a program that would allow computer users to swap files with one another
directly, without going through a centralized file server or middleman." Karl T. Greenfeld, Meet
the Napster, Time 60 (Oct 2, 2000). For a discussion of peer-to-peer networking, see John Bor-
land, The P2P Myth: Democracy's Traffic Jams at 11, CNET News.com (Oct 26,2000), available
online at <http:/lnews.cnet.com/news/0-1005-201-3248711-2.html> (visited Dec 23,2001).
5 See Part III.A.
6 See Part I.
7 Id.
8 National Research Council, Digital Dilemma at 2 (cited in note 2).
9 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: The Law and Lore of Copyright from Gutenberg
to the Celestial Jukebox 15-26 (Hill & Wang 1994).
10 See Part II.B. Some critics have also labeled these advocates as "copyright maximalists"
and opponents of expanded copyright regulations as "copyright minimalists." See, for example,
Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab at 1, Wired (Jan 1996), available online at
<http:/lwww.wired.comhviredlarchive/4.01/white.paper-pr.html> (visited Dec 23, 2001) (criticiz-
ing the Clinton administration's proposed copyright legislation for giving too much control to
copyright owners at the expense of the freedom and privacy of the general public).
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argues that copyright should be extended "into every corner where
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works."" According
to Professor Goldstein, the next logical step in copyright's trajectory is
the creation of a "celestial jukebox" in which individuals have access
to an unprecedented library of music, literature, and video-on a pay-
per-use basis, of course.2 According to the optimists, the free
downloading and file sharing of music facilitated by Napster is noth-
ing more than theft.
Critics counter that exceptions to copyright should be recognized
under the fair use doctrine for certain uses of digital information." In
response to efforts to expand copyright, the critics primarily rely upon
some fundamental or overriding public interest. For example, Yochai
Benkler argues that freedom of speech should limit copyright's expan-
sion." Julie Cohen suggests that the First Amendment supports a right
to read anonymously,5 and others argue that exceptions to copyright
should be recognized for productive uses of information, including
scholarship and scientific research. The principal question asked in
the current debate is whether certain uses of copyrighted information
are of sufficient social value to merit the recognition of a new excep-
tion, or to preserve an existing exception, to copyright in cyberspace.
17
While these critiques are important, they only respond to a subset
of the problems presented by the digital dilemma. Specifically, they do
not address the copyright questions presented by the recent decisions
11 9 20against Napster,'8 MP3.com," and 2600 magazine, or consumer con-
11 Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 236 (cited in note 9).
12 Id.
13 See Part II.C.
14 Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraints on Enclo-
sure of the Public Domain, 74 NYU L Rev 354, 386-87, 393-401, 412-14 (1999) (analyzing the
conflict between the interests protected by the First Amendment and those served by copyright,
and critiquing the claim that copyright increases diversity of information or promotes free ex-
pression).
15 Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management"
in Cyberspace, 28 Conn L Rev 981, 1003-19 (1996) (arguing that the First Amendment protects
the right to read anonymously because of "the close interdependence between receipt and ex-
pression of information and between reading and freedom of thought").
16 See Part ll.C.
17 On October 1, 2000, Harvard Law School sponsored a debate on "The Future of Intel-
lectual Property on the Internet." One of the discussions that took place between Stanford pro-
fessor Lawrence Lessig and Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of Amer-
ica, nicely illustrates the arguments on both sides of this controversy. See The Future of Intellec-
tual Property on the Internet:A Debate (Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law
School 2000), available online at <http://cyber.law.harvard.edulfutureofip/archive.asp> (visited
Dec 23, 2001).
18 A & M Record4 Inc v Napster, Inc, 114 F Supp 2d 896,927 (N D Cal 2000) ("Napster r')
(granting motion for preliminary injunction against Napster), affd in part and revd in part, 239
F3d 1004,1029 (9th Cir 2001) ("Napster I") (holding that the plaintiff established a likelihood of
success on copyright claims, but the district court's preliminary injunction was overbroad).
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cerns raised in those cases over restrictions on their ability to copy
works for personal and noncommercial use. The average consumer
would find it difficult, if not impossible, to argue that her conduct
should be protected because it is necessary for the pursuit of scholar-
ship, or that restricting her ability to share files infringes upon her
right to speak freely or invades her privacy. Yet the millions of indi-
viduals who share files through Napster, or copy music they have pur-
chased so they can listen to it in the home, car, or office do not con-
sider personal copying to be piracy or inconsistent with intellectual
property laws.2' Instead, the rise of a pay-per-use world can be seen as
an invasion of their liberty, an age-old criticism that was best de-
scribed by British historian Thomas Macaulay when he declared that
copyright was "'a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to
writers.' ''n Certainly some of the public's sentiments regarding copy-
right are self-serving, but not all of them.n So is there a response to the
claim that Napster users are stealing?
In addressing the digital dilemma and the problems presented by
Napster, we are ignoring a fundamental question: Should digital works
be entitled to copyright protection at allf By asking whether a par-
ticular use should be exempted from copyright, we assume that digital
works are entitled to copyright protection in the first instance. Tradi-
tionally, the answer to the question-Is copyright needed as an incen-
tive for the creation of intellectual works and their dissemination to
the public?-was relatively straightforward. Copyright was necessary
19 UMG Recordings, Inc v MP3.COM, Inc, 92 F Supp 2d 349,353 (S D NY 2000) (denying
MP3.com's fair use defense as a matter of law).
20 Universal City Studios, Inc v Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 2d 294,304 (S D NY 2000) (enjoin-
ing the distribution of a computer program designed to allow private copying of DVDs).
21 See Dick Kelsey, Jury Pool Survey -Napster's Chances Good at 2, Newsbytes (Oct 10,
2000), available online at <http://www.newsbytes.comlnews/00/156450.html> (visited Dec 23,
2001) (reporting that "41.5 percent of 1,000 men and women over 18 years of age believe that
taking copyrighted music off the Internet should be free if it's for personal use"); Jefferson Gra-
ham, Napster Fans Angered by Deal, USA Today 1A (Nov 2,2000) (reporting that fans accused
Napster of selling out by agreeing to a licensing agreement); Office of Technology Assessment,
Copyright & Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law, 163-65 (GPO 1989) (noting that
the public seems to think it fair to leave current home taping practices unchanged).
22 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright.'A Study of Copyright in Books, Photo-
copies and Computer Programs, 84 Harv L Rev 281,281 (1970), quoting T. Macaulay, Speeches
on Copyright 25 (C. Gaston 1914).
23 Charles Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, Atlantic Monthly 39,57 (Sept 2000) (noting that
user sentiment regarding music sharing is based partly upon greed); Jon Pareles, Envisaging the
Industry as the Loser in Napster, NY Times El (Feb 14,2001) ("Napster provides something that
for many listeners is even more desirable than free tunes: access.").
24 In this respect this Article builds upon then-Professor Breyer's landmark work, in which
he suggested that copyright protection for books, among other works, may not be justified be-
cause market principles would ensure a sufficient financial return for the original publisher of a
work. See Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 291-308 (cited in note 22).
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to provide financial incentives for both creation and distribution.2 Be-
fore the Internet, the rights of authors, publishers, and the public were
generally aligned because of one important fact: providing the public
with access to content was costly.2 Regardless of whether content
creators required a financial incentive to create, distributors of con-
tent required a financial incentive to make the necessary investments
to distribute those works to the public.2 Who would invest the money
necessary to press thousands of albums of a new recording artist or
purchase printing presses, paper, and ink to publish a new novel unless
there was the potential to recoup that initial investment and then
some? Because of the costs of copying and distribution, the interests
of creators and distributors were generally bundled together and
treated as one, and the rights granted under copyright law were seen
as consistent with Congress's power to "promote the progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts."2 While disembodied ideas may spread freely as
Jefferson suggested, the books and albums conveying those ideas
come at a price. But what happens in a world in which the cost of du-
plicating and distributing music and other creations of the mind is
zero? Beyond the rhetoric, what happens to copyright if we take seri-
ously the proposition that the Internet and digital technology are truly
revolutionary? I
This Article argues that cyberspace and the economics of digital
technology require the unbundling of the public's interests in the crea-
tion and distribution of digital works. Once they are unbundled, the
assumption that digital works are entitled to copyright protection is
no longer warranted. Critics of Napster and other file-sharing tech-
nologies fear the power of the Internet to distribute digital informa-
tion "virally," that is, the potential for a single digital copy of a work to
be duplicated without limit and spread throughout the Internet. When
creation and distribution are unbundled, however, it becomes clear
that this viral nature of digital information represents a development
25 While Breyer suggested that it might still be possible for publishers to profit in a world
of plastic, paper, and ink without copyright because the initial publisher always enjoys the bene-
fit of being first to market, even he recognized that copyright might still be necessary because
subsequent pirating might undermine the initial investment. See id at 300-05; Stephen Breyer,
Copyright:A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L Rev 75, 80 (1972).
26 See Part IV.
7 See, for example, Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 15 (Prometheus 2001) ("If creators
can't gain some benefit from their creations, they may not bother to make new works."); Jack
Valenti, Copyright & Creativity- The Jewel in America's Trade Crown:A Call to the Congress to
Protect and Preserve the Fastest Growing Economic Asset of the United States 18 (Jan 22,2001),
available online at <http:l/www.mpaa.org/jack/2001/1-01_22b.htm> (visited Dee 23, 2001)
("Who will put up risk capital if expensive copyright works are taken without payment or permis-
sion? Who and Why?"). But see Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 282 (cited in note 22) ("It would be
possible, however, to do without copyright.").
28 USConstArtl,§8,cl8.
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to be embraced rather than feared, precisely because technology
makes viral distribution possible at no cost to the content provider.
9
To the extent that there are costs associated with disseminating digital
content, they are borne by the users of information through the pur-
chase of computer equipment and connections to the Internet." As
such, the Internet and digital technology eliminate one of the principal
problems created by the public good nature of information-the pub-
lic's failure to internalize the cost of distributing intellectual works.'
Copyright, therefore, is no longer necessary to create property rights
artificially in digital works to eliminate free riding.3
The economics of digital technology also suggests that the exclu-
sive rights created by copyright are inconsistent with society's interest
in promoting the creation of new music and making music widely
available to the public.33 When the incentives for creation are exam-
ined in isolation from the incentives for distribution, the argument
that copyright should limit personal and noncommercial copying of
music cannot be justified, because of the existence of financial incen-
tives for musicians to make music and the minimal role that copyright
plays in creating those incentives. Moreover, in light of alternative
methods for funding musicians, including statutory levies,3' denying the
public access to music can no longer be justified as a necessary or de-
sirable means for encouraging the creation of music.
Under these circumstances, the file sharing enabled by digital
technology and Internet services such as Napster is not theft. Instead,
it is an example of what Joseph Schumpeter described as "creative de-
struction.' 35 In his landmark work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democ-
29 See Part I.
30 See Part IV.
31 Id.
32 A copyright owner's exclusive right to control the copying and distribution of her work
traditionally was considered necessary to prevent members of the public from enjoying the bene-
fits of the work without contributing to defray its costs (that is, free riding). See Part II.A.
33 With respect to copyright as a means for encouraging creation, this Article focuses on
the creation of music. As discussed in Part V, the financial investment necessary to create music
is minimal, and more importantly, copyright's exclusive rights to copy and distribute music play a
negligible role in providing royalties to musicians. The vast majority of musicians derive their in-
come from other sources, such as concert ticket sales. Differences in the costs of creating other
works, including books, computer software, and motion pictures, and the availability of alternate
sources of revenue may result in different conclusions. A detailed discussion of these differences
is beyond the scope of this Article.
34 A statutory levy is a tax that could be imposed on the sale of various goods and services
related to the duplication and distribution of digital works that would then be used to fund crea-
tion. As discussed in Part VI, this is the funding scheme adopted by the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992, see notes 327-30 and accompanying text, and being considered by the German gov-
ernment.
35 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 81-86 (Harper Perennial
1976).
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racy, Schumpeter argued that the most important form of competition
keeping capitalist markets from becoming monopolistic is not compe-
tition in the ordinary sense, such as competition with respect to price,
quality, and effort.36 Instead, the "fundamental impulse that sets and
keeps the capitalist engine in motion" is the process of creative de-
struction," a process "that incessantly revolutionizes the economic
structure [by] incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a
new one."3' This is a form of competition that "strikes not at the mar-
gins of the profits and the outputs of existing firms but at their foun-
dations and their lives.3 9 In this process of creative destruction, digital
technology and the Internet strike at the foundation of copyright and
the industries built upon copyright by eliminating the need for firms
to distribute copyrighted works and for exclusive property rights to
support creation.
Part I of this Article briefly describes how digital technology fa-
cilitates both the copying and dissemination of information as well as
how it can be used to restrict access to information. Part II begins by
discussing the first principles of copyright law, and then examines the
current debate between those in favor of expanding copyright and
those against it. Part III analyzes how this debate has played out in
three recent cases, and the limits of fair use as a defense for private
consumer copying.
The Article then asks whether copyright protection for digital
works is necessary for the creation and dissemination of digital works
and suggests that the economic justifications for copyright do not sup-
port exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute digital works. After
analyzing why copyright was justified in the past, Part IV argues that
the economics of digital technology eliminates the need for copyright
as an incentive for distribution. Part V examines the role copyright
currently plays in encouraging the creation of music, and whether the
elimination of copyright will impact music creation. It then identifies
existing sources of revenue for musicians and how free music may in
fact increase revenue to artists.
If additional funding to support creation is considered necessary,
Part VI proposes the Digital Recording Act. Instead of relying upon
the artificial property regime created by copyright's exclusive rights to
reproduce and distribute works, the proposal would fund the creation
of music through taxation of computer and other electronic equip-
ment and services that facilitate the copying of digital music, with
those funds disbursed to artists based upon aggregate Internet use.
36 Id at 84.
37 Id at 83.
38 Id at 83.
39 Id at 84.
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Part VI argues that this scheme is superior to copyright because it en-
courages creation while avoiding the market-distorting effects of
copyright's monopoly. Rather than supporting the establishment of a
"celestial jukebox," the new economics of digital technology argues
against efforts to alter what Thomas Jefferson described as nature's
"benevolent design."
I. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA
The characteristics of the digital technology at the root of the
digital dilemma are undisputed. While digital technology can be used
to facilitate and improve copying, it can also be used to restrict access
to content in ways not possible with the technologies of Gutenberg's
printing press.
At the heart of the digital revolution is the ability to reduce in-
formation to binary digits. Unlike traditional analog, print, or video, in
which music, writings, and images respectively were captured and con-
veyed as physical representations of what was recorded, digital tech-
nology reproduces those same sights, sounds, and words as numbers.-
For example, music is digitally recorded by measuring the height of
the sound wave generated by music at 44,100 times per second and re-
cording those samples instead of physically reproducing the sound
wave in the grooves of a vinyl album. Similarly, images are digitized
by reducing an image to component dots (the more dots, the more ac-
curate the image) and assigning numbers to those dots to represent
color. 2 Creating a sequence of digital images digitizes video.43
By reducing information to ones and zeros, digital representation
revolutionizes the characteristics of content. First, digital representa-
tion frees content from the need for a tangible medium to distribute it.
In the past, content could be conveyed to the public only through
physical media such as film, paper, plastic, etc., and the physical media
limited its distribution and copying. Distributing copyrighted works
in the form of books, CDs, and videos was similar to the distribution of
wine. In order to distribute wine to the public, one needed bottles.
Even if wine was plentiful, bottles were not. In contrast, the data rep-
40 National Research Council, Digital Dilemma at 28-29 (cited in note 2). See also Infor-
mation Infrastructure Task Force, White Paper at 12 (cited in note 2) ("Any two-dimensional
work can be readily 'digitized'-i.e., translated into a digital code (usually a series of zeros and
ones)."). 1
41 National Research Council, Digital Dilemma at 30 (cited in note 2).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id at 32-33.
45 See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas at *2, Wired (March 1994), available
online at <http:/www.wired.comlwiredlarchive/2.03/economy.ideashtml> (visited Dec 23, 2001)
(analogizing copyright to the distribution of wine in bottles).
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resenting a recent hit song, a newborn's picture, or a scholar's work in
progress no longer need to be carried in plastic or on paper. Digital in-
formation can be conveyed without the need for a bottle.4 Reduced to
ones and zeros, digital information can be transmitted through the ra-
dio waves of the electromagnetic spectrum, as electrical impulses
through telephone and cable wires, and as light across fiber optic net-
works with the information alone traveling to the recipient.47 To the
extent that one desires permanently to bottle digital information for
either transportation or storage, one can preserve it across media
ranging from computer hard drives to CDs, floppy disks, and memory
sticks.4
Another revolutionary characteristic of digital reproduction is
the ability to make perfect copies. An analog recording of a CD, radio
broadcast, or a photocopy of a book is not the same as the original,
and subsequent copies continue to degrade.9 In contrast, digital copies
are identical to the original digital master.2 A digital copy can there-
fore be used to produce countless subsequent digital copies, all identi-
cal to the original.
Digital technology also changes the economics of copying. Unlike
the manufacturing of bottles or books, copying digital information is
both inexpensive and simple. Reduced to ones and zeros, information
can be copied by any home computer and stored on the hard drive or
a CD in minutes or seconds. Consequently, to copy an entire ency-
clopedia collection, one no longer needs to have the financial re-
sources to invest in printing presses, warehouses, and employees to re-
produce each volume, when the entire collection can be copied and
stored so easily.2 Combined with the Internet, digital reproduction
makes it possible for every home computer to make and distribute
perfect copies worldwide at billions of bits per second.- The only costs
46 While the Internet eliminates the need for the bottle, there may still be significant value
in making old bottles. For example, while a digital book may be a less expensive, more versatile
product compared to a hardbound edition, the two are not perfect substitutes. Many people may
prefer the tactile sensation of paper and leather to reading on a computer screen or handheld
device. Similarly, there will still be markets for compact discs in the foreseeable future given the
ubiquity of compact disc players, the convenience of purchasing rather than burning discs, the re-
liability of the data stored on purchased CDs, and the selection of music on CDs.
47 National Research Council, Digital Dilemma at 32-33 (cited in note 2). In this respect,
digital information shares the same characteristics with analog information.




52 Id at 31-32.
53 See id at 32.
54 Id at 38. See also Information Infrastructure Task Force, White Paper at 12 (cited in note
2) (noting that the Internet "makes it possible for one individual, with a few key strokes, to de-
liver perfect copies of digitized works to scores of other individuals-or to upload a copy to a
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of becoming a global distributor (or pirate) of digital content are the
price of a computer, Internet access, and electricity.
Combined, the characteristics and economics of digital reproduc-
tion eliminate some of the most important obstacles to copying. Tradi-
tionally, the investments needed to reproduce and distribute content
in a physical form, the physical form itself, and the poor quality of re-
productions deterred copying. The size of the investment needed to
make bottles and distribute those bottles limited the number of copi-
ers. Likewise, the physical bottles made it possible to find and seize
copies, and the quality of copies made them less than perfect substi-
tutes.' These obstacles were the natural outgrowth of the way in which
content was distributed and the economics associated with distribu-
tion. Digital technology is not bound by these restraints.
The digital music experience illustrates the impact of digital tech-
nology on the copying and distribution of content. A typical song can
be digitally recorded and then stored as an MP3' file approximately
three megabytes in size with CD quality sound.m The music either can
be saved as an MP3 directly by an artist or can be converted from a
CD. '9 The music file can then be distributed quickly and easily to oth-
ers over the Internet through World Wide Web pages, posted in news-
groups, shared in chat rooms, or attached to e-mail. 'w Once
downloaded from the Internet, a user can save MP3s on a computer's
hard drive, burn them onto a blank CD, or save them on some other
storage device.
Napster and other peer-to-peer networks facilitate the distribu-
tion of digital content by allowing individuals not only to search for
bulletin board or other service where thousands of individuals can download it or print unlim-
ited 'hard' copies").
55 See National Research Council, Digital Dilemma at 32-33 (cited in note 2) ("For every
form of digital information, every copy is as good as the original and can therefore be the source
of additional perfect copies, which greatly reduces what was once a natural impediment to copy-
right infringement.").
56 See id at 32 (noting that the copy quality decreases with each successive generation of a
"traditional form" of information).
57 "MP3" stands for MPEG 1 Layer 3. "MPEG," in turn, stands for Moving Picture Experts
Group. See David A. Hepler, Comment, Dropping Slugs in the Celestial Jukebox: Congressional
Enabling of Digital Music Piracy Short-Changes Copyright Holders, 37 San Diego L Rev 1165,
1174 n 44 (2000), citing What is MP3? at 3, CNET Newacom (July 22,1999), available online at
<http:/www.cnet.com/software/0-3227895-7-294826.html?st.sw.toplOmp3.index-ss.sw> (visited
Dec 23,2001).
58 Hepler, Comment, 37 San Diego L Rev at 1174 (cited in note 57). See also Preston
Gralla, How the Internet Works 222-23 (Que Millennium Edition 1999).
59 Gralla, How the Internet Works at 222-23 (cited in note 58).
60 See National Research Council, Digital Dilemma at 78 (cited in note 2); Information In-
frastructure Task Force, White Paper at 12 (cited in note 2) (noting that the establishment of
"electronic systems makes it possible for one individual, with a few key strokes, to deliver perfect
copies of digitized works to scores of other individuals"); Kiersten Conner-Sax and Ed Krol, The
Whole Internet: The Next Generation 361 (O'Reilly 1999).
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MP3s on the Web, but also to search for MP3s and other files stored
on other people's hard drives.1 Peer-to-peer networking dramatically
expands the universe of available music. Before Napster, music and
other content were only available if someone posted the content to a
web page or newsgroup or attached it to an e-mail. Peer-to-peer net-
working streamlines the publishing process by making information re-
siding on a user's computer hard drive directly available to other users
of the network. Using Napster or Gnutella, an individual who has re-
corded a favorite CD onto her computer's hard drive need only log on
to the network to make those songs available to millions of others to
download.6
The ease and popularity of peer-to-peer networking is demon-
strated by Napster's tremendous growth. At its height, Napster was es-
timated to have approximately seventy-five million registered users
downloading approximately ten thousand songs per second., Accord-
ing to internal estimates, Napster was capable of growing by more
than 200 percent per month without marketing.n
Not only has technology made it easier to copy music, but it has
also dramatically reduced the costs of copying. In 2001, for less than
$900, one could purchase a home computer with a high-speed proces-
sor, forty gigabyte hard drive, and CD-RW drive capable of burning
CDs.6 Blank CDs with a storage capacity of seven hundred megabytes
could be purchased for approximately $0.40 each.6 Depending upon
the speed, users could obtain Internet access for free or by paying up
to $40 per month.u A single CD could hold approximately twenty al-
bums worth of music, and the hard drive could hold over one thou-
61 See A & M Records Inc v Napster, Inc, 114 F Supp 2d 896, 905-06 (N D Cal 2000)
("Napster 1").
62 Id.
63 Napster utilizes centralized servers to maintain a directory of users currently logged in
to the network and files stored on each user's computer. See Napster , 114 F Supp 2d at 905.
When a user desires to download a file from another user, Napster's servers provide the relevant
contact information, and the file is then transferred between users. See id at 906-07. In contrast,
Gnutella and other services do not maintain centralized servers. Searches are conducted through
the individual computers that make up the network. See Borland, P2P Myth at J1 13-15, CNET
News.com (cited in note 4) (describing the differences between Napster and Gnutella).
64 Napster 1, 114 F Supp 2d at 902. See also Leander Kahney, Intel Says: Think Like Napster
at 2, Wired News (Aug 24, 2000), available online at <http://www.wired.comlnews/
printO,1294,38413,00.html> (visited Dec 23,2001) (reporting that Patrick Gelsinger, an executive
at Intel, considers peer-to-peer networking technology "a revolution that will change computing
as we know it").
65 Napster 1,114 F Supp 2d at 902.
66 See Jim Heid, Mac Focus: Feel the Burn: Toast Does More Better, LA Tunes T1O (Apr 19,
2001) (discussing pricing history of CD burners and noting that one may be purchased for $89).
67 See, for example, <http://wwiv.officedepot.com> (visited Dec 23,2001).
68 In 2001, individuals could access the Internet over their home telephones for free or for
approximately $10 a month. Noah Rothbaum, The Prepaid Trap, Smart Money 76 (Oct 1, 2001)
(noting that NetZero was providing unlimited Internet access for $9.95 per month).
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sand albums.6' Under these circumstances, the marginal cost for a user
to download or copy an MP3 is effectively zero.7° To save that music on
a CD, the marginal cost of copying is $0.40 per CD, making the aver-
age variable cost of copying an album $0.02 per album.7' To many in-
volved in the copyright industry, Napster's potential for distributing
music and the reduced costs of copying represent the dark side of digi-
tal technology. Unbounded by the restraints of brick-and-mortar eco-
nomics, anyone with a computer and Internet access is now a potential
copier and distributor of music.
Technology, however, is a double-edged sword. While digital
technology facilitates the copying and distribution of digital informa-
tion, it also permits greater control over the use and distribution of in-
formation. As noted by Mark Stefik, with the development of tech-
nology, "authors and publishers can have more, not less, control over
their work." As Lawrence Lessig explained to the legal community,
because digital technology relies upon computer code to function,
computer code can be used to regulate behavior.2 For example,
through the use of trusted systems, current copyright holders can use
technology to control how works are accessed. Trusted systems use
encryption7 5 to prevent unauthorized access to digital content, and
69 These calculations are based upon the assumptions of three megabytes per song and
twelve songs per album.
70 Marginal costs "include only the additional costs of producing one more unit." David W.
Barnes and Lynn A. Stout, Cases and Materials on Law and Economics 349 (West 1992). For the
purposes of this calculation, the cost of electricity is not included. The fact that the marginal cost
for downloading music is zero is not an entirely new economic phenomenon in regards to con-
tent distribution. Both broadcast and to some degree movie theaters share similar economic
characteristics because the cost of adding an additional viewer or listener is zero, or in the case of
a theater, the cost of adding an additional audience member is zero until the theater is full. How-
ever, the total fixed costs of Internet distribution are significantly lower. See id (defining total
fixed costs as the costs that do not vary with how much is produced).
71 Average variable cost is "the sum of all variable costs divided by output." Phillip Areeda
and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 Harv L Rev 697,700 (1975).
72 Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights
Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 Berkeley Tech L J 137,138 (1997).
73 For a general discussion, see Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Ba-
sic 1999).
74 "A trusted system is a system that can be relied upon to follow certain rules." Stefik, 12
Berkeley Tech L J at 139 (cited in note 72). See also Mark Gimbel, Some Thoughts on the Impli-
cations of Trusted Systems for Intellectual Property Law, 50 Stan L Rev 1671,1672 (1998) ("Nas-
cent technologies promise to grant the owners of digital property an unprecedented degree of
control over their products.").
75 Encryption is the technology used to prevent unauthorized access to computer files
typically by scrambling the data with what is known as a public key. The data can then only be
unscrambled with the corresponding private key. See Sabra Chartrand, A New Encryption Sys-
tem Would Protect a Coveted Digital Data Stream, NY Tunes C8 (July 3, 2000) (discussing how
encryption can be used to protect digital music).
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they use rights management 6 to determine what "rights" any given
user has with respect to that content." By distributing music through a
trusted system, content providers can not only charge users for every
copy made, they could theoretically charge users every time a song is
played, limit the locations in which a file could be used, or even pro-
gram a file to expire after a certain date.7
Trusted systems already exist for the distribution of digital con-
tent on the Internet. For example, RealAudio, an alternative to MP3,
relies upon trusted systems technology to distribute digital content in
a format that can limit the ability of users to play, copy, or save files.
79
Files saved in RealAudio format can only be played with a RealAudio
player, and the player is programmed to determine whether any par-
ticular use is authorized." Specifically, RealAudio gives content pro-
viders the ability to stream audio or video files to users, preventing
them from making permanent copies of the fie, or to allow users to
download permanent copies.8
To date, the success of trusted systems obviously has been limited
by the availability of free MP3s. To combat the spread of MP3s, the
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") has proposed
the Secure Digital Music Initiative ("SDMI").8 SDMI would require
manufacturers of consumer electronics to adopt trusted systems tech-
nology if they want their devices to play commercially recorded mu-
76 Used in conjunction with a trusted system, rights management is the ability of a pub-
lisher of a work to define what rights subsequent users of her work will have to use, copy, or edit
the work. Stefik, 12 Berkeley Tech L J at 140-41 (cited in note 72).
77 See id at 140 ("Digital rights fall into several natural categories. For example, transport
rights include the rights to copy, transfer, or loan. Render rights include the right to play and
print. Derivative work rights include the rights to extract, embed, and edit.").
78 Digital Video Express (Divx), LP, attempted this format as an alternative to DVD. If us-
ers owned a Divx-compatible machine, they could purchase a digital video for less than the price
of purchasing a DVD, and would have the opportunity to view the video for forty-eight hours.
Once the forty-eight hours passed, the disc would no longer work unless the user paid another
fee. See Jim Millick and Bill Cruce, Cybertheater Wsits Divx at 9, available online at
<http:/lwww.cybertheater.com/News._VewslDivxlDivx.html> (visited Dee 23, 2001).This version
of a DVD should not be confused with DivX, a new file format based upon MPEG-4 compres-
sion. See DivX Digest, available online at <http://www.divx-digest.com/help.html> (defining
DivX). See also Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v& Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Manage-
ment on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 NC L Rev 557,564-67 (1998) (arguing that an auto-
mated rights management system enabling providers to bill consumers for their use will improve
the efficiency of licensing practices and may be more beneficial than the current copyright laws);
Eric Schlacter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could
Be Unimportant to the Internet, 12 Berkeley Tech L J 15,38 (1997) (discussing rights management
systems as alternatives to copyright).
79 See RealNetwork4 Inc v Streambox, Inc, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 1889, *4-5 (W D Wash)
(discussing the process by which RealAudio files are controlled).
&o Id at *5.
81 Id at*6.
82 See Matt Richtel and Sara Robinson, Ear Training: A Digital Music Primer, NY Tunes
C6 (July 19,1999).
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sic.6 If successful, SDMI would reportedly prevent users from "rip-
ping" CDs, burning CDs, downloading music, or copying to a portable
player unless they have paid for the privilege. The motion picture in-
dustry adopted a similar approach with digital movies distributed on
DVDs. Each DVD is encrypted by a copy protection system known as
the Content Scramble System ("CSS"). A movie recorded on DVD
may only be viewed on players and computer equipment using CSS-
licensed technology, and the equipment is programmed to permit the
user to play, but not copy, the movie.8
Digital technology, therefore, has the power to set music free or
lock it up.Y The great debate of the twenty-first century is over which
direction we shall take. The terms of this debate, however, are not
about technology. As Ithiel de Sola Pool wrote, technology "shapes the
structure of the battle, but not every outcome. '8 Law and politics de-
termine the outcome.
II. THE COPYRIGHT DEBATE
A. Copyright First Principles
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.""' With regard to music, books, and
movies, Congress has chosen to promote progress through the law of
copyright.9 Copyright law gives authors certain exclusive rights in
their works, including (as the name describes) the right to copy.91 As
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Universal City Studios, Inc v Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 2d 294,303,308 (S D NY 2000).
86 Id at 308.
87 See id at 304 ("Technological access control measures have the capacity to prevent fair
uses of copyrighted works as well as foul. Hence, there is a potential tension between the use of
such access control measures and fair use.").
88 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 251 (Belknap 1983).
89 US ConstArtI,§ 8,c18.
90 See 17 USC § 102 (1994 & Supp 1999) (listing types of works protected by copyright).
91 17 USC § 106 (1994 & Supp 1999) provides:
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any
of the following: to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted works; to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending; in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion pic-
ture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and in the case of
sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of digital audio
transmission.
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the Constitution provides, copyright does not protect a natural right of
an author in her work, although it is influenced by the fact that con-
tent is produced by the author's labor.? Instead, copyright law repre-
sents a bargain between the public and the author in which the public
grants the author certain exclusive rights in exchange for access to her
creation?3 This access takes two forms: access to the work during the
period of exclusive rights on terms generally dictated by the author or
her assigns, and unfettered access to the work after those exclusive
rights have expired.?
This bargain is considered useful, if not necessary, because works
of authorship share some of the characteristics of a "public good."
Public goods are generally defined by two traits. First, once produced,
they are virtually inexhaustible. This means that "it is possible at no
cost for additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public good."
'
95
Second, it is difficult to prevent people from enjoying the good. Tho-
mas Jefferson described the public goods nature of ideas when he
wrote:
92 See Sony Corp ofAmerica v Universal City Studios; Inc, 464 US 417,429 (1984):
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather the limited grant is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
See also Feist Publications; Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340,349 (1991) ("The pri-
mary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts."'), quoting US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8; Mazer v Stein, 347 US 201, 219
(1954) (recognizing that the "economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by per-
sonal gain is the best way to advance public welfare"); United States v Paramount Pictures, Inc,
334 US 131,158 (1948) ("The copyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary consid-
eration."). See generally Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and
Possession, 51 Ohio St L J 517,518-20 (1990) (discussing the rejection of an absolute property
right in intellectual property under Anglo-American law and proposing an alternative
interpretation of natural law).
93 See Litman, Digital Copyright at 80-86 (cited in note 27) (discussing the evolution in
metaphors used to justify copyright laws and analyzing the effect of those metaphors on the pub-
lic's willingness to offer content owners extensive control).
94 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L J 965, 967-68 (1990) (describing
dimensions of the public domain); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information
Age, 75 Or L Rev 19,33 (1996) ("We want members of the public to be able to learn from [art-
ists' works]: to extract facts and ideas from them, to make them their own, and to be able to build
on them.").
95 Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J L & Econ 293, 295
(1970). See Ronald V. Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Prop-
erty 79-80 (Westview 1996) (defining public goods as those that allow joint, nonrival consump-
tion by all potential consumers); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
Harv L Rev 1659, 1700 (1988) (stating that the problem with works of intellect is that they are
public goods that "can be used and enjoyed by unlimited persons without being 'used up"').
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If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others
of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called
an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself
into the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispos-
sess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one pos-
sesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He
who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself with-
out lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives
light without darkening me.6
At first glance, these traits appear positive. However, they can
also be cause for concern when one recognizes the potential for "free
riding."' The non-exclusive characteristics of a public good increase
the likelihood that some people will enjoy the benefits of the good
without internalizing the costs of its production.8 If the funding of
public goods is left to the private market, free riding may lead to the
underproduction of the good.9 In other words, if enough people de-
cide that they can enjoy the benefits of a lighthouse without paying
for its costs, soon there will be no lighthouse.
Astute readers will note that, while the preceding may describe
ideas, songs, or poetry, it does not precisely describe CDs, books, or
sculptures. While ideas may be non-exclusive, I can certainly keep
people from reading my book or listening to my CD. As such, the CD
is a private good.'6 Nonetheless, we have traditionally protected not
only the song, but the song embodied in a CD as well. The justifica-
tions for this protection are the obvious public benefits of embodying
works of authorship in a tangible medium and the need to protect
against the copying that threatens the publication and distribution of
works. While a song or story may spread by word of mouth, fixing
those works in tangible form facilitates the dissemination of those
works to larger portions of the public while preserving the artist's
original expression. However, once a work is distributed, subsequent
copiers may be able to distribute the work without incurring costs or
bearing risks equal to those borne by the initial publisher. If competi-
96 Letter from Jefferson to McPherson at 1015 (cited in note 1).
97 See generally Edwin Mansfield, Principles of Microeconomics 70,74-75 (Norton 1974)
(discussing the concept of free riding).
98 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600,1611 (1982) (stating that one char-
acteristic of a public good is that it is difficult to prevent persons who have not paid for a public
good from using that good).
99 See id.
100 See Bettig, Copyrighting Culture at 80 (cited in note 95) (discussing the distinction be-
tween public goods, whose consumption is nonrivalrous, and private goods, whose use may be
excluded from others).
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tion from copiers drives the price of a work down to the marginal
costs of the copier or the original publisher, it threatens the incentives
to distribute the work in the first place. ' If publishers have no incen-
tive to publish new works, the public's access to or ability to enjoy
those works will be significantly reduced. In other words, even though
a CD or book is a private good, copying still threatens the market for
such goods.
Copyright, therefore, is designed not only to protect the author,
but also to protect the incentives of the publisher. This is accom-
plished by granting authors legally enforceable rights in their works
similar to property rights in tangible property, which can be used to
control copying, distribution, and other uses of those works. The au-
thor assigns or licenses these rights to the publisher to protect the
publisher's interests as well. Law, therefore, makes it possible to have
a private market for works of authorship by artificially rendering
those works scarce and exclusive.
B. The Case for Expanding Copyright
According to self-proclaimed copyright optimist Paul Goldstein:
The digital future is the next, and perhaps ultimate, phase in
copyright's long trajectory, perfecting the law's early aim of con-
necting authors to their audiences, free from interference by po-
litical sovereigns or the will of patrons. The main challenge wiii
be to keep this trajectory ... true to copyright's historic logic that
the best prescription for connecting authors to their audiences is
to extend rights into every corner where consumers derive value
from literary and artistic works.in
The optimists, therefore, claim that law should prevent digital
technology from being used for uncompensated copying and should
recognize authors' rights to use technology to lock up digital content.
Copyright optimists often use the rhetoric of protecting the moral and
natural rights of authors to reap what they have sown, ° but given the
Constitution's utilitarian slant, their principal argument is that copy-
right should be extended because the financial incentives it creates in-
101 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325,326 (1989) (stating that copyright protection trades off the costs of lim-
iting access to a work and the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first
place); Lessig, Code and Other Laws at 133 (cited in note 73).
102 Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 236 (cited in note 9).
103 Id at 11 ("Bubbling beneath all of them, including copyright, is the intuition that people
should be able to hold on to the value of what they create, to reap what they have sown.'); Tes-
timony of Lars Ulrich, Metallica band member, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
4 (July 11, 2000), available online at <http://judiciary.senate.govn7112000_lu.htm> (visited Dec
23,2001) (arguing that musicians should not be forced to work for free).
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crease the public good.'The logic of their argument is powerful in its
simplicity-more copyright protection produces more incentives for
creation. So "if the work has commercial value, copyright's aim is to
put that value in the copyright owner's pocket."''
The arguments of the copyright optimists provide the foundation
for what Yochai Benkler describes as the "enclosure movement,"' ° or
what Pamela Samuelson calls the "copyright grab."' Through law and
technology, copyright optimists are attempting to control not just ar-
guably new uses of information, as represented by MP3s, but also uses
of information that have historically been considered free under copy-
right's fair use doctrine. ' This latter category includes such uses as re-
cording a favorite television show, copying a newspaper article to
share with people at work, or copying favorite songs into a new mix to
share with a friend."' With the help of the very same digital technology
that they have demonized, copyright optimists see the potential to
"reverse the losses they see copyright owners suffering today when
people make copies of films and sound recordings: by charging sub-
scribers electronically for each use of the prerecorded works" through
a digital "celestial jukebox."'10
To the copyright optimist, previously recognized exceptions to
copyright infringement for personal, educational, and scholarly copy-
ing were grudgingly accepted because they represented instances of
market failure.1 ' In other words, the uses of information that we cur-
104 Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 11 (cited in note 9). See also Trotter Hardy, Property
(and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U Chi Legal F 217,219-229 (explaining how incentives to
produce informational works can be analyzed and arranged and how such a taxonomy explains
the pressures on Congress to expand copyright rights).
105 Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 7 (cited in note 9).
106 Benkler, 74 NYU L Rev at 354-55 (cited in note 14) ("We are in the midst of an enclo-
sure movement in our information environment. In other words, our society is making a series of
decisions that will subject more of the ways in which each of us uses information to someone
else's exclusive control.").
107 Samuelson, The Copyright Grab at 1, Wired (cited in note 10) (arguing that the Clin-
ton administration proposed "a wholesale giveaway to its supporters in the copyright industry").
108 See id (noting the maximalist agenda to end fair use rights).The fair use doctrine repre-
sents an historic exception to copyright liability for certain uses that fit the literal definition of
copyright infringement. See Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios; Inc, 464 US 417,447
n 29 (1984) ("The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a 'fair use' provision. Al-
though that Act's compendium of exclusive rights 'to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the
copyrighted work' was broad enough to encompass virtually all potential interactions with a
copyrighted work, the statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the stat-
ute literally in every situation."). Congress codified the doctrine in 17 USC § 107 (1994 & Supp
1999).
109 See Sony Corp, 464 US at 456 (holding that home videotaping is fair use); id at 481-82
(Blackmun dissenting) (noting that sharing a news clipping would not be considered copyright
infringement).
110 Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 30 (cited in note 9). See also Bell, 76 NC L Rev at
579-84 (cited in note 78) (arguing for a quasi-compulsory licensing scheme).
111 See generally Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1614-27 (cited in note 98).
The New Economics of Digital Technology
rently consider fair use were only tolerated because of the high trans-
action costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and controlling
such uses."2 According to Wendy Gordon, whose seminal work forms
the foundation for this argument, exceptions to copyright should only
be recognized when "the possibility of consensual bargaining has bro-
ken down in some way."113
Building upon Professor Gordon's work, others argue that the
fair use doctrine should be significantly narrowed because digital
technology improves a copyright owner's ability to commodify intel-
lectual property, making it more like tangible property, and reduces
the transaction costs associated with bargaining and enforcement.114
For example, Tom Bell and Trotter Hardy argue that the Internet,
online contracts, and technological measures designed to control ac-
cess to copyrighted works reduce transaction costs, thus eliminating
most instances of market failure."5 According to Professor Bell,
trusted systems "radically reduce[ ] the transaction costs of licensing
access to copyrighted works," and "[i]nsofar as it responds to market
failure, therefore, fair use should have a much reduced scope."' 6 The
reduction in transaction costs will benefit the public by increasing the
value of copyrighted works, thus encouraging greater production and
improving distribution."7 Similarly, Professor Hardy argues that be-
cause transaction costs in cyberspace "appear to be falling quite rap-
idly," a private property regime for information works in cyberspace
would best promote the development and usefulness of cyberspace by
minimizing the inefficiencies of liability rules and group bargaining
costs."8 As Professor Cohen notes, for these cyber-economists,
"[d]igital technology enables the complete determination of property
rights and facilitates their exchange in relatively frictionless Coasean
112 Id at 1614-15.
113 Id at 1615.
114 See, for example, Bell, 76 NC L Rev at 579-80 (cited in note 78) (arguing that "auto-
mated rights management" will sharply lower transaction costs for regulating the use of copy-
righted materials); Hardy, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 236 (cited in note 104) (arguing that a principal
characteristic of property rules-that we rely on them in situations of low transaction costs-
applies to cyberspace, because cyberspace lowers the cost of communicating); Goldstein, Copy-
right's Highway at 224 (cited in note 9) ("The capacity of the celestial jukebox to post a charge
for access, and to shut off service if a subscriber does not pay his bills, should substantially reduce
the specter of transaction costs. As these costs dissolve, so, too, should the perceived need for
safety valves such as fair use."). But see Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?: Property Rights
and Contract in the "Newtonian World of On-line Commerce", 12 Berkeley Tech L J 115, 115
(1997) ("Arguing ... that transaction costs are negligible in the on-line environment is an over-
simplification.").
115 Bell, 76 NC L Rev at 580 (cited in note 78); Hardy, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 236-42 (cited
in note 104).
116 Bell, 76 NC L Rev at 583-84 (cited in note 78).
117 See id at 589.
118 Hardy, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 259-60 (cited in note 104).
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markets not just because it should, but because it must."'1 9 As noted by
Ronald Bettig, this reflects the fact that neoclassical economists begin
with the "value based judgment that private property is necessary to
approach anything resembling economic efficiency in information
markets.,, ' O
To date, the copyright optimists' digital agenda has found support
in all three branches of government. Through its "White Paper," the
Clinton administration championed the cause of copyright owners,121
and Congress enacted those proposals into law when it passed the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). ' Congress concluded
that even temporary electronic files are copies subject to copyright
law;n made it illegal to distribute or use any technology designed to
circumvent technological measures protecting intellectual property
regardless of whether the circumvention was for purposes of fair use;12
and made Internet service providers responsible for contributory in-
fringement if they fail to remove or block allegedly infringing material
on their networks.'
Courts, like the President and Congress, have generally sided with
the optimists, despite the judicially created fair use doctrine.'6 In re-
jecting a fair use defense in the MP3.COM decision, Judge Rakoff
went so far as to say that "[t]he complex marvels of cyberspatial com-
munication may create difficult legal issues; but not in this case.
' '7
Some courts and state legislatures have recognized a copyright
119 Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Man-
agement", 97 Mich L Rev 462,561 (1998). As Professor Cohen notes, one of the problems of the
neoclassical economic approach underlying the enclosure movement is that it assumes an
"equivalency between private wealth and social gain." Id at 560. This assumption is particularly
inappropriate given that copyright's goal is not to maximize wealth, but to maximize the number
of works created and available to the public.
120 Bettig, Copyrighting Culture at 106 (cited in note 95).
121 See generally Information Infrastructure Task Force, White Paper at 178 (cited in note 2)
(explaining the Clinton Administration's positions on intellectual property and the Internet).
122 Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998), codified as amended in various sections of 17
USC (Supp 1999).
123 See 17 USC § 101 (Supp 1999) (defining "copies" as "any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device"). See also No Electronic Theft Act of 1997,
Pub L No 105-147,111 Stat 2678, codified at 18 USC §§ 2319-20 (Supp 1999) (amending 17 USC
§ 506 to clarify that reproduction and distribution include electronic means); US Department of
Justice, Criminal Division, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, The No Electronic
Theft ("NET") Act: Summary of Changes to the Criminal Copyright and Trademark Laws (Feb
18, 1998), available online at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminallcybercrime/netsum.htm> (visited
Dec 23,2001).
124 See 17 USC §§ 1201-05 (Supp 1999).
125 See 17 USC § 512 (Supp 1999).
126 See Part III.
127 UMG Recordings, Inc v MP3. COM, 92 F Supp 2d 349,350 (S D NY 2000).
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owner's ability to control the use of his works through "one-click" or
"shrink-wrap" licensing agreements.1s
C. The Fair Use Response
With some exceptions,m critics of the "copyright grab," who have
been labeled copyright pessimists, do not challenge the application of
existing copyright law to digital works. Instead, they are disturbed by
efforts to expand copyright, especially in cases in which that expansion
comes at the expense of other overriding societal interests.m For ex-
ample, Yochai Benkler argues that copyright's expansion should be
limited by the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.'3' According to Professor Benkler, the DMCA and other aspects
of the optimists' agenda are suspect because they regulate the public's
ability to engage in expression.2 Julie Cohen argues that Congress
and the courts should recognize a right to read anonymously as a cor-
ollary to the right to speak.'33 According to Professor Cohen, the moni-
128 See ProCD, Inc v Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447,1455 (7th Cir 1996) (enforcing shrinkwrap li-
censing terms); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Computer Information Transaction Act ("UCITA") 2, available online at
<http://www.ucitaonline.com> (visited Jan 19,2002) (proposing uniform rules to recognize the
validity of mass market licenses for intellectual property); Md Comm Code Ann §§ 22-101 et seq
(2000) (adopting UCITA); Va Code Ann §§ 59.1-501.1 et seq (Michie 2001) (same). But see Klo-
ceck v Gateway, Inc, 104 F Supp 2d 1332,1341 (D Kan 2000) (refusing to enforce a shrinkwrap li-
cense because there was no acceptance of the license according to Kansas or Missouri contract
law).
129 See Litman, Digital Copyright at 180 (cited in note 27) (raising concerns about the appli-
cation of copyright to "everyone, everywhere"); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change:
A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 215,271-
83 (1996) (raising concerns about the application of copyright to private use of digital works).
See also Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 321 (cited in note 22) (arguing that the case for copyright pro-
tection of certain books is weak); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentive-Access
Paradigm, 49 Vand L Rev 483, 487-88 (1996) (arguing that copyright protection should be lim-
ited to the extent that it creates greater incentives to invest in intellectual property than other
goods).
130 See Ruth Okediji, Givers Takers and Other Kinds of Users:A Fair Use Doctrine for Cy-
berspace, 53 Fla L Rev 107, 117 (2001) (arguing for the retention of fair use standards because
"copyright envisions use by members of the public"); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property
and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14
Berkeley Tech L J 519, 522-24 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions
did not adequately consider the interests of Silicon Valley); Benlder, 74 NYU L Rev at 446 (cited
in note 14); Elkin-Koren, 14 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J at 224 (cited in note 129) (noting the im-
portance of social dialogue); David Lange, Copyright and the Constitution in the Age of Intellec-
tual Property, 1 J Intel Prop L 119,123 (1993) (arguing for the need for individuals to engage in
"creative play").
131 Benlder, 74 NYU L Rev at 446 (cited in note 14). See also Melville B. Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L
Rev 1180, 1200-04 (1970) (discussing the tension between copyright and the First Amendment
and concluding that the First Amendment does not justify "the expropriation of authorship").
132 Benkler, 74 NYU L Rev at 445-46 (cited in note 14).
133 Cohen, 28 Conn L Rev at 1003-19 (cited in note 15).
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toring of individual behavior through copyright management systems
may threaten self-expression by deterring individuals from reading
controversial works.'
Similarly, Neil Netanel argues that instead of a market-based ap-
proach, copyright should be interpreted under a democratic paradigm
that recognizes the need to maintain copyright as a means of support-
ing a "system of self-reliant authorship, diversity, and the dissemina-
tion of information" while imposing limits consistent with copyright's
democracy-enhancing function. '35 Still others, including Pamela
Samuelson and Jessica Litman, insist on preserving existing fair use
exceptions and importing them into the digital context.6 According to
Professor Litman, preserving existing fair use exceptions is consistent
with the public's expectations and understanding of its bargain with
copyright owners.
In many respects, these critiques are consistent with traditional
efforts to define fair use as including productive or socially valuable
uses. As Judge Leval has suggested, "In analyzing a fair use defense,
it is not sufficient simply to conclude whether or not justification ex-
ists. The question remains how powerful, or persuasive, is the justifica-
tion because the court must weigh the strength of the secondary user's
justification against factors favoring the copyright owner."'39 As
Robert Merges notes, focusing on competing values is logical: "Since
markets are possible and feasible between all parties in a digital envi-
ronment, the relevant policy questions will center on when it makes
sense to do an 'end run' around the market. '
134 Id at 1007-10.
135 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L J 283,339,
362-63 (1996).
136 See Samuelson, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 539 (cited in note 130) (arguing against the ex-
tension of copyright to such uses or their digital equivalents unless it is necessary to protect digi-
tal markets); Elkin-Koren, 14 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J at 273,277 (cited in note 129) (arguing
that users must be allowed "to do the same things they are able to do in a non-digitized envi-
ronment"); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 29, 40
(1994) (arguing that an individual's ordinary reading, viewing or listening to an authorized copy
of work does not invade the copyright owner's rights); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright
in Cyberspace: Don't Throw Out the Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 Ann Surv Am L
403, 405 (arguing for maintaining "some approximation of our current cheap and simple access
to copyrighted works for research, scholarship and pleasure").
137 Litman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J at 40 (cited in note 136).
138 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev 1105, 1111 (1990)
("The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a
different purpose from the original."). See also Okediji, 53 Fla L Rev at 174 (cited in note 130)
(arguing that fair use in cyberspace maintains the requirement of productivity).
139 Leval, 103 Harv L Rev at 1111 (cited in note 138).
140 Merges, The End of Friction at 134 (cited in note 114).
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More recently, Professor Litman, who has argued vigorously in
defense of a vibrant public domain,4' has suggested that copyright's
expansion requires a renegotiation of copyright's quid pro quo.'42 Em-
phasizing the classic metaphor of copyright as a bargain between the
public and copyright holders and the fact that copyright holders have
never been entitled to control all uses of their works, she argues that
copyright's current expansion has myopically focused only on the
copyright holder's side of the bargain.'4 What of the public's interest?
If copyright is to expand, Professor Litman argues, that expansion
should reflect what the public considers to be legitimate uses of works
of authorship.'" As such, she suggests that we "stop defining copyright
in terms of reproduction" and focus instead on commercial exploita-
tion.J
While I generally agree with these critiques and believe that they
contribute greatly to our understanding of the relationship between
copyright and other important societal interests, the circumstances
they address are limited. As discussed below, attempting to identify
compelling or overriding public interests to justify private copying of
digital music is too great a stretch. Ultimately, copyright optimists are
not arguing for a right absolutely to deny the public access to their
works or to enclose the public domain permanently; it is not in their
financial interests to do either. ' Instead, they simply want users to pay
them for accessing those works. Under these circumstances, it is diffi-
cult to refute Professor Gordon's argument that "to propose that fair
use be used whenever the 'social value ... outweighs any detriment to
the artist[ ]' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of their
141 See Litman, 39 Emory L J at 968 (cited in note 94) (arguing that the public domain is the
"device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship
available for authors to use").
142 See Litman, Digital Copyright at 174-86 (cited in note 27) (proposing that copyright law
be reformulated to better incorporate the public's understanding of the copyright bargain by
asking and addressing what the public wants or deserves).
143 Id at 174.
144 See id at 180 (arguing that because the public appears to believe that the copyright law
incorporates a distinction between commercial and noncommercial behavior, lawmakers should
think about copyright infringement in terms of what effect a user's actions have on the copyright
holder's opportunities for commercial exploitation).
145 Id.
146 See Testimony of Fred Ehrlich, President of New Technology and Business Develop-
ment for Sony Music Entertainment, Inc, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary f[ 16
(July 11, 2000), available online at <http:/judiciary.senate.gov/7112000_fe.htm> (visited Dec 23,
2001) (describing the recording industry's plans to enter the digital market); Valenti, Copyright &
Creativity at 14 (cited in note 27) ("Movie companies would be fiscally mad to want to put
their films in a vault, unseen by customers."). Ironically, copyright law already gives copyright
owners the right to keep a work from being published. See Harper & Row Publishers v Nation
Enterprises, 471 US 539, 554-55 (1985) (recognizing an author's right to choose when first to
publish).
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right in the property precisely when they encounter those users who
could afford to pay for it."' 7 The wisdom of this end run around copy-
right can also be questioned when one takes into account that "the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.
By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas."'
Likewise, while I agree with Professor Litman's ultimate conclu-
sion that we should eliminate the right of reproduction and focus in-
tellectual property law on commercial exploitation, her solution is a
political one. What happens when Congress, as it did with the DMCA,
decides to give copyright owners a bigger slice of the pie?' As Litman
demonstrates so well, throughout most of copyright's history, the legis-
lative process has been dominated, if not captured, by the copyright
industry. '" If we adopt Litman's framework, are we left only with the
argument that copyright's terms are not in the public interest?''
As presented, the copyright debate appears to be a zero-sum
game. Encouraging creativity comes at the expense of public access.
Similarly, allowing uncompensated access to works reduces the incen-
tive to create future works. This is what Professor Lunney describes as
the incentive-access paradox. The critics of the enclosure movement
argue that the tradeoff between access and incentives is acceptable
because the value of the particular use to society outweighs any loss of
creation. As Part III of this Article demonstrates, when the use is or-
147 Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1615 (cited in note 98), quoting Note, Parody and Copyright
Infringement, 56 Colum L Rev 585,595 (1956).
148 Harper & Row, 471 US at 558. See also Eldred v Reno, 239 F3d 372,380 (DC Cir 2001)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act). See also Gordon,
82 Colum L Rev at 1612 (cited in note 98) ("A democratic society demands decentralized and
diverse creation in the intellectual spheres; freedom from state control is essential lest freedom
of expression be curtailed by governmental reprisal."); Netanel, 106 Yale L J at 288 (cited in note
135) (arguing that copyright serves democracy by funding an independent creative sector).
149 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,
101 Colum L Rev 1613,1615 (2001) (suggesting that the DMCA "may in fact have enhanced the
ability of copyright owners to wield electronic protective measures to control new kinds of ex-
ploitation of their works").
150 See Litman, Digital Copyright at 22-32 (cited in note 27) (describing how the copyright
industry has successfully lobbied for greater and greater copyright protection).
151 See Robert P. Merges and Glenn H. Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and
Patent Power, 37 Harv J on Legis 45, 65 (2000) (arguing that laws granting copyright term exten-
sions should be considered unconstitutional because they represents "special-interest graft").
152 Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 557-58 (cited in note 129):
If we limit a work's protection to ensure its dissemination, we necessarily reduce the incen-
tive to create such work and decrease the chance that the work would have been created in
the first place. If we increase a work's protection to increase the chance of its creation, we
necessarily increase the price the author will charge for the work and thereby restrict access
to the work if and when it is created.
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dinary consumer use, courts are reluctant to conclude that access out-
weighs copyright's incentives scheme. Furthermore, as discussed in
Parts IV and V, the current debate is misleading because digital tech-
nology makes it possible to resolve the incentive-access paradox, and
to provide the public with access to works even for ordinary use, with-
out diminishing the incentives for creation and dissemination.
III. THE LITIGATION
Three recent decisions involving Napster, MP3.com, and 2600
magazine illustrate the current debate between copyright optimists
and pessimists and the limits of that debate in helping us to under-
stand the impact of digital technology. Without questioning copyright's
assumptions, these cases attempt to import the existing fair use doc-
trine into the digital context. In each case, the need to preserve copy-
right's incentive scheme is considered paramount.
A. A & M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc ("Napster I") 'o
Frustrated by the difficulty of finding MP3 files on traditional
Internet servers, a college student named Shawn Fanning created
Napster.4 By downloading free software, a user could log on to Nap-
ster and share music files with other users who were also on the net-
work."- Known as peer-to-peer networking, Napster enabled users to
search for music on the hard drives of other users instead of searching
for music available on World Wide Web pages."' In effect, Napster
made any digital home recording of music available to its members.
Because the vast majority of music available on Napster was copy-
righted, the recording industry brought suit for, among other things,
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement."' Napster coun-
tered that its users' "file sharing" should be considered fair use."'
In addressing these questions, the district court concluded that
the recording companies established a prima facie case of direct copy-
right infringement by Napster's users. According to the court, "virtu-
ally all Napster users engage in the unauthorized downloading or up-
153 114 F Supp 2d 896,927 (ND Ca12000), affd in part and revd in part,239 F3d 1004,1029
(9th Cir 2OOl).
154 Napster 1, 114 F Supp 2d at 901-02. See generally Testimony of Shawn Fanning, founder
of Napster, Ine, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 6-12 (Oct 9,2000), available
online at <http://judiciary.senate.govlO92000 sfhtm> (visited Dec 23,2001).
155 See Napster 1,114 F Supp 2d at 905-07 (describing the Napster technology).
156 See id at 902.
157 Id at 900.
158 Id at 900-01.
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loading of copyrighted music."'59 The court then turned to analyzing
the four factors of the fair use doctrine set forth by the Copyright Act:
(1) the purpose and character of the using, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work."
Because music is creative in nature, and users could download en-
tire songs, the second and third factors weighed against fair use.'6' Ac-
cording to the court, the purpose and character of the use also
weighed against a finding of fair use. Napster's users were not using
the copyrighted works in a way that transformed the copyrighted ma-
terials."a Users were not attempting to use the songs for parody or for
research, but were merely copying and listening to the music. As such,
there could be no claim that the use was justified by some overriding
governmental interest like the advancement of scientific or medical
research."
As to whether the use was commercial, the court concluded that
while the use was not "paradigmatic commercial activity," it could not
be considered personal use "in the traditional sense.'"" According to
the court, the "vast scale" of file sharing facilitated by Napster could
not be considered private use.' ' Moreover, while the activity was not
for profit, it was certainly economic in nature. The fact that "Napster
users get for free something they would ordinarily have to buy sug-
gests that they reap economic advantages from Napster use."'6
Similarly, the court found that the effect of the use upon the value
of the work and potential markets for the work weighed against find-
ing that Napster use constituted fair use. According to the court, Nap-
159 Id at 911.
160 See id at 912, quoting 17 USC § 107 (Supp 1999).
161 See Napster 1,114 F Supp 2d at 913.
162 See id at 912-13.
163 See id at 913-14. See also Williams & Wilkins Co v United States, 487 F2d 1345,1354 (Ct
Cl 1973) (concluding that the prevention of private photocopying of scientific journals would
threaten the advancement and dissemination of scientific and medical research), affd, 420 US
376 (1975) (per curiam).
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ster use harmed the market for copyrighted music by reducing CD
sales among college students and by raising barriers to entry in the
market for digital downloading.' The recording companies presented
evidence of a decline in CD sales at highly wired college campuses
and campuses that subsequently banned Napster use."'1 In the three-
year period between 1997 and 2000, the recording companies' study
indicated that while CD sales nationwide had risen by 18 percent,
sales near these college campuses dropped by 12-13 percent.'6 The in-
ference, of course, was that the decline in sales resulted from MP3
downloads replacing CD purchases. With respect to the downloading
market, the court accepted the recording industry's common-sense ar-
gument that the availability of free downloading reduced the market
for competing commercial downloading, and that this downloading
deprived copyright owners of royalties for downloading even if it en-
hanced CD sales.'70
In rejecting Napster's fair use defense, the court distinguished the
Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp of America v Universal City
Studios, Inc,'71 in which the Court concluded that the home taping of
copyrighted television programs was fair use.'n Unlike home VCR us-
age, in which users were initially invited to view the television broad-
cast for free, Napster users obtained permanent copies of songs that
they would otherwise have had to purchase.' Similarly, according to
the court, the majority of VCR users merely enjoyed the tapes at
home. In contrast, "a Napster user who downloads a copy of a song to
her hard drive may make that song available to millions of other indi-
viduals ... facilitat[ing] unauthorized distribution at an exponential
rate."'74 In short, the district court concluded that the conduct of Nap-
ster users could not be considered fair use because it threatened the
incentives created by copyright.'
75
B. UMG Recordings, Inc v MP3.COM, Inc'76
UMG Recordings, Inc v MP3. COM, Inc raised the question of fair
use under circumstances in which both the person uploading and
167 Id at 913.
168 Id.
169 Michael Fine, Soundscan Study on Napster Use and Loss of Sales at 5 (Soundscan Jun
12,2000), available online at <http://www.riaa.com/PDF/fine.pdf> (visited Dec 23,2001).
170 See Napster 1, 114 F Supp 2d at 915.
171 464 US 417 (1984).
172 Id at 456.
173 See Napster 1, 114 F Supp 2d at 913 (distinguishing the case from Sony).
174 Id.
175 This conclusion was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. A & M Record, Inc v Nap-
ster, Inc, 239 F3d 1004,1014 (9th Cir 2001) ("Napster I').
176 92 F Supp 2d 349 (S D NY 2000).
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downloading the music had purchased a commercial copy of the CD."
The website MP3.com launched a service, "My.MP3," that would allow
a subscriber to listen to her personal collection of CDs anywhere she
could access the Internet.'" To accomplish this, MP3.com purchased
tens of thousands of popular CDs and copied them onto its computer
servers to replay to My.Mp3 subscribers.'" To obtain access to these
recordings, a subscriber had to prove that she actually owned the CD
version of the recording, either by inserting a copy of the CD into her
computer or by purchasing it from a cooperating online retailer.'5 The
court concluded that on its face, defendant's copying was a presump-
tive case of copyright infringement.'8'
In its defense, MP3.com argued that its service should be consid-
ered fair use because it enabled users to "space shift."'85 In other
words, the service simply replicated a user's traditional ability to listen
to music she owns in different locations. Instead of having to bring a
CD with her, she could simply listen to it over the Internet. In reject-
ing the fair use defense, the court, like the court in Napster, concluded
that the copying and playing of music was not considered a transfor-
mative or productive use, that music recordings were at the core of in-
tended copyright protection, and that whole works were copied.' The
pivotal factor, therefore, was market harm.
On the question of market harm, the recording companies could
not demonstrate any loss in either CD sales or the market for digital
downloading. Arguably, My.Mp3 enhanced CD sales because both
MP3.com and its subscribers had to purchase CDs."' Similarly,
MP3.com was not competing with copyright owners in the digital
downloading market. It merely provided a service to users who had
already purchased a CD or digital download, arguably enhancing the
markets for both. Nonetheless, the court found these arguments un-
persuasive: "Any allegedly positive impact of defendant's activities on
plaintiffs' prior market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further
market that directly derives from reproduction of plaintiffs' copy-
righted works."''' In other words, space shifting was another potential





182 Id at 350-51.
183 See id at 351-53 (analyzing MP3.com's actions under the fair use doctrine enunciated in
17 USC § 107).
184 See id at 352 (rejecting as unpersuasive the argument that the defendant's activities en-
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market for copyright owners, and in the absence of their authoriza-
tion, MP3.com had no right to enter that market. The fact that
My.Mp3 was merely the digital analog to a consumer's current ability
to space shift was irrelevant. Wholeheartedly buying the copyright op-
timist position, the court concluded that a copyright "is not designed
to afford consumer protection or convenience but, rather, to protect
the copyright holders' property interests."''
C. Universal City Studios, Inc v Reimerdes '
If Napster and MP3.COM stand for the proposition that copy-
right should "extend rights into every comer where consumers derive
value from literary and artistic works,"' Universal City Studios, Inc v
Reimerdes adds that protecting this expansion is important enough to
justify restrictions upbn free speech."' The controversy in Reimerdes
arose because the motion picture industry uses CSS'9' to control access
to and prevent the copying of motion pictures recorded on DVDs.'9 In
September 1999, Jon Johansen, a fifteen-year-old, and two others cre-
ated DeCSS, a program capable of "ripping" DVDs, which then allows
users to play the data on noncompliant computers as well as copy the
recordings."3 The defendants, who published the magazine 2600: The
Hacker Quarterly, posted DeCSS on their website"' and linked to
other sites posting DeCSS."'
Eight major motion picture studios brought suit under an anticir-
cumvention provision of the DMCA"' to enjoin 2600 from posting
DeCSS."7 The anticircumvention provisions prohibit offering to the
public or trafficking in any technology designed to circumvent a tech-
nological measure that controls access to a work.' 2600 argued that
the posting of DeCSS was speech protected by the First Amend-
ment."'
187 Id.
18 118 FSupp2d294 (SDNY2000).
189 Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 236 (cited in note 9).
190 See Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 2d at 332 (recognizing that computer code is within the area
of First Amendment concern, but holding that under the circumstances of the case the applica-
tion of the DMCA's antitrafficking provisions did not violate the Frst Amendment).
191 CSS is "an encryption based system that requires the use of appropriately configured
hardware such as a DVD player or a computer DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back,
but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs" Id at 308.
192 See id.
193 See id at 311 (describing the creation and development of DeCSS).
194 See <http://www.2600.com> (visited Jan 15,2002).
195 See Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 2d at 312.
196 17 USC § 1201(a)(2) (Supp 1999).
19 Reirnerdes, 111 F Supp 2d at 303.
198 See 17 USC § 1201(a)(2).
199 Reirnerdes, 111 F Supp 2d at 304.
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While the court agreed with 2600 that computer code was expres-
sivem it concluded that the DMCA is a content-neutral regulation
that only incidentally affects expression.20'As such, the DMCA would
be upheld if (1) it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest (2) unrelated to the suppression of free expression and (3) the
incidental restriction on free expression is no greater than is essential
to further that interestm For this discussion, only the first part of the
three-part test is relevant.
In upholding the anticircumvention provisions, the court con-
cluded that the important governmental interest justifying the
DMCA's restrictions upon expression is "the protection of copy-
righted works stored in digital media from the vastly expanded risk of
piracy in this electronic age.''m According to the court:
Once a decryption program like DeCSS is vfitten, it quickly can
be sent all over the world. Every recipient is capable not only of
decrypting and perfectly copying plaintiffs' copyrighted DVDs,
but also of retransmitting perfect copies of DeCSS and thus ena-
bling every recipient to do the same. They likewise are capable of
transmitting perfect copies of the decrypted DVD. The process
potentially is exponential rather than linear.20'
Consequently, unless the dissemination of DeCSS is stopped, it is
likely to produce "virtually unstoppable infringement of copyright."20'
In the court's view, the spread of DeCSS and the copying it enables
resembled an epidemic in which each "infected" individual is capable
of spreading the disease, but unlike a disease, none of those "infected"
has an interest in being "cured."2 0 According to the court, the preven-
tion of this outbreak is important enough to justify restricting even the
fundamental right of freedom of expression.
D. Conclusion
Napster, MP3.COM, and Reimerdes demonstrate the degree to
which the copyright optimists have succeeded in framing the terms of
the debate. All three decisions turn upon the perceived importance of
copyright and Congress's determination that copyright owners should
have the right to exploit any and all markets for copies. These deci-
200 See id at 326 ("It cannot seriously be argued that any form of computer code may be
regulated without reference to First Amendment doctrine. The path from idea to human lan-
guage to source code to object code is a continuum.").
201 Id at 329.
2m Id at 329-30.
203 Id at 330.
20 Id at 331.
205 Id at 332.
206 Id.
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sions demonstrate the limits of relying upon a significant social value
to justify exceptions to copyright, especially with respect to consumer
copying. In balancing copyright's goals with the public's interest in ob-
taining music for free, "free music" loses because there is no overrid-
ing societal interest in it. As Justice Blackmun noted in Sony, "When
the ordinary user decides that the owner's price is too high, and for-
goes use of the work, only the individual is the loser." Not only did
the courts in Napster and MP3.COM both agree with Justice Black-
mun that there is no significant interest served in consumer copying, in
Reimerdes, the court concluded that Congress's interest in prohibiting
such copying was substantial enough to justify restricting even free-
dom of speech. The remainder of this Article provides an alternative
criticism of copyright's expansion by demonstrating that copyright's
exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute digital works are not only
unnecessary to encourage the creation and dissemination of such
works, they hamper the progress of science and the useful arts.
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION
In the United States, copyright protection is justified solely as an
incentive for the creation and distribution of content.= As discussed
above, the protection of music, literary works, and other content is not
based upon the moral or natural rights of authors.29 Instead, copyright
exists to ensure that content will not be underproduced as a result of
the public-good characteristics of intellectual property."0 The artificial
scarcity created by copyright is justified to the extent that the incen-
tives it creates are needed to make works available to the public. This
means that if adequate financial incentives or market conditions exist
to inspire the creative activity of authors and encourage them to make
their works available to the public without copyright, copyright pro-
tection should not be recognized." Over thirty years ago, then-
Professor Breyer argued that books and other copyrighted works may
not be entitled to copyright protection because the economics of pub-
207 464 US at 477 (Blackmun dissenting).
203 For the purposes of this Article, creation is defined as the act of producing an original
work and fixing the work in digital form. Distribution is defined as the act of making and dis-
seminating subsequent copies.
209 See Sony, 464 US at 429.
210 See Part II.
211 See Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 487-88 (cited in note 129) (noting that overbroad copy-
right protection imposes a cost represented by "the lost value society would have associated with
alternative investments to which these resources would otherwise have been devoted"); Landes
and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332 (cited in note 101) (recognizing that "beyond some level
copyright protection may actually be counterproductive by raising the cost of expression");
Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 322 (cited in note 22) (arguing that copyright's protection of books is
not justified).
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lishing rendered copyright unnecessary. 2 Time and advances in
technology may well prove Breyer right, though not for the reasons he
suggested.
Today, the economics of digital technology renders copyright
both unnecessary and inefficient. In general, discussions about the op-
timal level of copyright protection ignore distinctions between the in-
centives for creation and distribution.2 3 In part, the bundling of these
interests was strategic. Distributors found that it was to their political
advantage to have their interests treated as inseparable from the in-
terests of creators.14 In addition to the rhetorical power of equating
the interests of distributors with creators, until now the bundling of in-
terests was acceptable because the cost of producing the vessels-
CDs, books, and DVDs-for content, and distributing those vessels,
was an essential component of making content available to the public.
As a result, both sets of costs had to be considered if the public was to
enjoy the products of the human mind.21 However, as the following
demonstrates, because the Internet and digital technology have revo-
lutionized the ways in which we disseminate information,211 it is no
longer appropriate to treat these interests as interchangeable. Once
they are unbundled, it becomes clear that copyright protection cannot
be justified as a means of ensuring distribution and is an impermissi-
bly inefficient means for ensuring creation. This Part discusses the
need for copyright as an incentive for distribution, and Part V exam-
ines copyright as an incentive for creation.
A. The Distribution Technologies of Gutenberg and the Relevance
of Copyright
Arguably, the need to ensure adequate compensation for dis-
tributors is at the heart of the neoclassical economic theory of copy-
212 See Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 322 (cited in note 22).
213 See Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 327 (cited in note 101) ("To simplify the
analysis, we ignore any distinction between costs incurred by authors and by publishers, and
therefore use the term 'author' (or 'creator') to mean both author and publisher."); Breyer, 84
Harv L Rev at 292 (cited in note 22) (focusing primarily on the costs of publishing).
214 As developed in England, the efforts of booksellers to obtain copyright were initially
unsuccessful until they tied their interests to the interests of writers. See Bettig, Copyrighting
Culture at 15-19 (cited in note 95) (noting that copyright originally developed to serve the inter-
ests of printers-authors still had to rely upon patronage); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality
in Copyright Law, 94 Mich L Rev 1197, 1197-98 (1996) (challenging the rhetoric claiming that
copyright expansion is in authors' best interests); Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 41-44 (cited
in note 9) (discussing how printers secured copyright protection in England for their own inter-
ests); Yen, 51 Ohio St L J at 525-26 (cited in note 92) (same). Consider James Boyle, Shamans;
Software & Spleens 81 (Harvard 1996) (discussing the use of the "romantic author" to justify
copyright protection).
215 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 326-27 (cited in note 101).
216 See Part I.
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right. Unlike content creators, who may have significant nonfinancial
motivations for creating content,21 7 content distributors are in the
business of distribution and cannot ignore financial considerations.2 8
In order to distribute music or books, we assume that initial distribu-
tors must at the very least recoup their fixed, copying, and distribution
costs if they desire in order to stay in business.219 It should not come as
a surprise, then, that distributors have influenced copyright law's
development from its inception and in some cases obtained rights
even before creators.2w
Traditionally, the most significant barrier to distributing works to
the public was the magnitude of the investment needed to become a
distributor.2" Starting a major record company or publishing business
is not cheap. In 1984, estimates suggested that it cost $125 million just
to maintain a national record distribution operation."m In part, this is
due to the fact that unlike the author's costs of creation, which are
fixed, distribution costs include not only fixed costs but also costs that
increase with the number of copies produced.22 Each CD must be
217 See Part V.
218 This is not to say that distributors are not concerned about art for art's sake or for rea-
sons such as fame. Unlike artists, however, businesses must consider financial gain if they want to
continue as businesses. See Netanel, 106 Yale L J at 340 (cited in note 135) ("But authors must
generally depend on publishers to disseminate their work, and publishers generally require, at
the very least, the possibility of recovering their costs in selecting, editing, marketing, and dis-
tributing creative works.")
219 See Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 327 (cited in note 101) ("For a new work to
be created, the expected return-typically, and we shall assume exclusively, from the sales of cop-
ies-must exceed the expected cost.").
220 Bettig, Copyrighting Culture at 15-19 (cited in note 95) (noting that copyright initially
developed to protect printers, not authors); Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 40-44 (cited in
note 9) (discussing how printers were responsible for the development of copyright law in Eng-
land); Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 292 (cited in note 22) (noting that the first grants of exclusive
rights in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were made to printers, not authors: "Historically
the publisher led the fight for laws that allow him to obtain exclusive rights.").
221 See Eric W. Rothenbuhler and John M. Streck, The Economics of the Music Industry, in
Alison Alexander, James Owers, and Rod Carveth, eds, Media Economics: Theory and Practice
199,213-15 (L. Erlbaum Associates 2d ed 1998) (discussing barriers to entry in the recorded mu-
sic industry); Statement of FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, et al, Five Consent Agreements Con-
cerning the Market for Prerecorded Music in the United States 21, FTC File No 971-0070 (Aug
30, 2000), available online at <http:/www.ftc.govlos/2000/09/musicstatement.htm> (visited Dee
21,2001) (recognizing that the "wholesale market for prerecorded music is characterized by high
entry barriers which limit the likelihood of effective new entry"). See also Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co v Tornillo, 418 US 241,251 (1974) (recognizing that the expense of becoming a pub-
lisher has made entry into the print media "almost impossible").
222 FTC v Warner Communications, Inc, 742 F2d 1156,1164 (9th Cir 1984). By one estimate,
the manufacturing and distribution costs for 110,000 copies of a single CD in Germany in 1998
were approximately $480,000. Music Economy Basic Information Service, Calculations for a Pop
Album, available online at <http://mebis.com/HitCalc.htm> (visited Dee 21, 2001). This figure
excludes marketing and royalties. Overall variable costs, including marketing and promotions,
royalties, manufacturing, and distribution, were estimated at $1,330,000 for the same album. Id.
M Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 327 (cited in note 101).
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manufactured, printed, packaged, and distributed. This requires an in-
vestment in material, equipment, personnel, and facilities. Moreover,
greater demand for, or wider distribution of, a CD means higher over-
all costs, both for making additional copies and for expanding the dis-
tribution network.24 So in order to make content available to large
portions of the population, distributors must have vast resources in
terms of capital and infrastructure. Economic incentive theorists,
therefore, justify copyright protection as necessary to encourage a dis-
tributor to make these significant investments.m If a subsequent com-
petitor could sell copies of the same work without incurring the same
expenses as the first distributor, competition would force prices down
to the copier's cost, and the initial distributor would not be adequately
compensated.2 Under those circumstances, potential initial distribu-
tors could be deterred from distributing content at all, or would have
an increased incentive to distribute "faddish, ephemeral, and other-
wise transitory works because the gain from being the first in the
market for such works would be likely to exceed the losses from ab-
sence of copyright protection."2 In either case, the public's interest in
greater diversity and availability of content would not be served.
Moreover, according to Professor Landes and Judge Posner, as
the costs of copying decrease, copyright protection must be increased.
According to their economic model, "if, over time, growth in income
and technological advances enlarge the size of the market for any
given work, and the cost of copying declines, copyright protection
should expand."' While this claim is by no means unassailable, 22 it ap-
pears quite reasonable. As the costs of copying decrease and more in-
dividuals are able to afford the technology necessary to copy, one can
assume that there will be a greater number of potential copiers. So
even though the copying costs for initial distributors will decrease as
well, they will be forced to compete with a greater number of copiers
and copies. Similarly, as technology reduces the amount of time
needed to make copies, any value the initial distributor is able to cap-
ture by being first to market will diminish as well.m The need for
224 See Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 294-95, 297 n 68 (cited in note 22) (reporting fixed and
variable costs for book publishing); Music Economy Basic Information Service, Calculations for
a Pop Album (cited in note 222) (estimating costs associated with making a successful CD).
M Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 335 (cited in note 101) ("Some copyright protec-
tion is necessary to generate the incentives to incur the costs of creating easily copied works.").
226 Id at 326; Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 282 (cited in note 22).
227 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332 (cited in note 101).
m Id at 344.
229 See Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 281 (cited in note 22) (arguing against stronger copyright
laws).
230 This is an important response to Breyer's argument because one of the advantages an
initial publisher would have is lead time. See Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 300 (cited in note 22).
However, Breyer also suggested that publishers had other strategies, including fighting editions
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greater protection remains even if the copies are made for private use
rather than for profit. From the perspective of the initial distributor's
incentives, it is the lost revenue attributable to substitute copies that
matters-not whether the copier makes a profit.
Content distributors point to the technological developments of
the last several decades as proof of Professor Landes's and Judge Pos-
ner's claim. Audiotape recorders, videotape recorders, and photocopy-
ing machines have reduced the costs of reproducing music, video, and
print. Today, many families can afford these copying technologies and
are capable of making copies of works instead of purchasing those
works for themselves and to distribute to others.3 ' As predicted, with
the reduction in costs came an increase in the amount of unauthorized
copying. At one point, the RIAA estimated that home taping of music
cost the industry approximately $1 billion a year in sales.32 Similarly,
the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA') currently esti-
mates that its members lose approximately $3 billion each year to ana-
log piracy.233
Napster is a perfect illustration of this claim with respect to digi-
tal technology. Falling prices for computers, computer memory, and
storage, and the growing availability of high-speed Internet connec-
tions, have contributed to an explosion in the copying of digitally re-
corded music. According to the trial court, Napster users were
downloading approximately ten thousand files per second, and the
service had an estimated seventy-five million users by the end of
2000;2m by some estimates, it was growing by more than 200 percent a
month without marketing.23 At this rate, assuming that the industry
and prepublication orders. Id at 301-05.
One possible critique of the economic model is that it appears to overstate the importance
of copying costs while not clearly considering the fixed costs of distribution. While a publisher's
costs increase with each copy made, that investment is not what is truly threatened by competing
copies. Those individual costs are quite small, and the risk of loss can be dealt with strategically.
Instead, the more important cost consideration is the initial investment in the equipment neces-
sary to make those copies at all. In other words, while a publisher incurs costs in printing an indi-
vidual book, those costs are not as significant an investment or barrier to becoming a publisher
as the initial investment in personnel, real estate, printing presses, trucks, etc. As technology re-
duces the costs of copying and distribution, it also reduces the initial investment necessary to be-
come a publisher.
231 See Bettig, Copyrighting Culture at 172,179 (cited in note 95) (describing the prolifera-
tion of home audio-taping and videotaping and noting that the VCR has reached "household
saturation"); Goldstein, Copyright's Highway at 147,157 (cited in note 9) (describing the prolif-
eration of the VCR during the litigation over the VCR).
232 Bettig, Copyrighting Culture at 172 (cited in note 95).
233 Valenti, Copyright & Creativity at 16 (cited in note 27).
234 See Napster 1, 114 F Supp 2d at 902.
235 Reports also indicate that decentralized peer-to-peer networks like Gnutella have simi-
lar potential to distribute content to millions of consumers. See generally Mike Yamamoto and
John Borland,A Brave New-or Old-World?, CNET News.corn (Oct 26, 2000), available online
at <http:llnews.cnet.comlnewsl0-1005-201-3248711-1.html> (visited Dec 21,2001) (describing the
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could charge $1 per download and that users were willing to pay if
Napster were not available, Napster use resulted in $10,000 in lost
revenue per second.36
While content distributors are able to demonstrate growth in un-
authorized copying and estimate their resulting losses, it has been
harder to demonstrate that copying has eliminated their financial in-
centives to distribute content. Despite the growth in unauthorized
copying, profits continue to rise and the number of new works contin-
ues to grow. There are several responses to these facts. First, content
distributors suggest that if they were able to capture the revenues lost
to unauthorized copying, they would have distributed even more CDs,
videos, and books. Second, continued profitability can be explained
because of economies of scale.239 This in turn has increased distribu-
tors' incentives to consolidate in order to take advantage of greater
economies of scale, and the resulting consolidations have led to a re-
duction in the number of potential offerings.m
Perhaps the most important argument made by content distribu-
tors is that they continue to remain viable because copies made with
non-digital technology are imperfect substitutes for their products. 14
Cassette tape recordings of CDs do not provide the same acoustical
clarity as the original CD recording. Similarly, a photocopy of a book
does not have the same clarity as the printed version. According to
some, as long as competing copies remained imperfect substitutes, the
potential of peer-to-peer networking).
236 See Testimony of Gene Hoffman, Jr., Founder, President, and CEO, EMusic.com, Inc,
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 3 (July 11, 2000), available online at
<http:lljudiciary.senate.gov711200ghj.htm> (visited Dec 21, 2001) (noting that EMusic sells
individual music tracks for $0.99 each). See also Prepared Testimony of Naomi Lefkovitz, Gen-
eral Counsel of CDNow, Inc, before the House Committee on Commerce 4, Federal News Ser-
vice (Apr 30, 1998) (noting estimates of online music sales by 2002 as between $1.6 and $4 bil-
lion). Of course, this is a rough estimate, as not every Napster user would be willing to pay.
237 See David Bauder, Napster's Effect on Sales Unclear 11, AP (Aug 20,2000), available
online at <http:lwww.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv/aponline/20000820/aponlinel55851_OOO.htm>
(visited Dec 21,2001); Brad King, Despite 'Piracy,' CD Sales Up I 3, Wired News (Apr 24, 2000),
available online at <http:l/www.wired.comlnewslbusinessl0,1367,35848,00.html> (visited Dec 21,
2001) (citing statistics showing that "the music industry has grown about 8 percent over last
year's first quarter").This has led some to argue that digital music actually encourages the sale of
CDs by acting as a form of advertising.
238 See Ehrlich Testimony at 9 (cited in note 146) (noting that only a small minority of hits
fund all of the investment in new music).
239 Bettig, Copyrighting Culture at 99-101 (cited in note 95) (noting how the film industry
benefits from economies of scale).
240 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Ex-
pression, 53 Vand L Rev 1879, 1882-83 (2000) (noting the concerns raised by concentration of
wealth and power in communications and mass media). But see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright
and Democracy:A Cautionary Note, 53 Vand L Rev 1933,1940 (2000) (noting that under certain
circumstances monopoly may in fact lead to greater diversity of content).
241 See National Research Council, Digital Dilemma at 32 (cited in note 2) (noting that cop-
ies made with digital technology are identical to the original).
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original content distributor maintained at least some competitive ad-
vantage, and had at least some, although diminished, financial incen-
tive to distribute content. However, digital technology threatens to
eliminate even those diminished incentives because copies of the
original digital work are now identical to the original, eliminating the
first distributor's most important competitive advantage.'
Moreover, only the most reductionist interpretation of incentive-
based copyright would argue that society should be unconcerned until
all financial incentives are eliminated. Arguably, if our goal is the
greater distribution of content, we should be concerned by reductions
in the revenues of initial distributors because they necessarily dimin-
ish the distributors' incentives to distribute.24 This is in part what Pro-
fessor Lunney describes as the incentive-access paradox. " Any reduc-
tion in profit necessarily leads to a reduction in incentives: "If we limit
a work's protection to ensure its dissemination, we necessarily reduce
the incentive" to distribute the work and decrease the chance that the
work would have been distributed in the first place.245 As Napster
learned, it is difficult to dispute that the unauthorized sharing of music
results in at least some loss in revenue, which in turn can be seen as
reducing the incentives of the recording industry to distribute digital
M iC2461
music.2'
It would appear that the economic arguments for increased copy-
right protection are difficult to refute short of arguing over whether
existing levels of incentives and availability of content are sufficient-
an argument with no clear answer.2 However, the economic argu-
ments for copyright depend upon an important assumption. They as-
sume that without the creation and recognition of some form of prop-
erty rights for content distributors, the consuming public will not ade-
quately internalize the cost of making that content available to them,
and as a result, less content will be made available. Under the Consti-
tution, copyright protection is, after all, instrumental, and does not ex-
ist to protect the financial incentives of distributors for their own sake.
As the following discussion demonstrates, the economics of digital
technology challenges this assumption.
242 See id.
243 See Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 326 (cited in note 101).
244 See Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 557 (cited in note 129) (discussing how reducing the rent
an author receives reduces the incentive to create).
245 Id.
246 See Prepared Testimony of Tom Silverman, CEO of Tommy Boy Records, before the
House Small Business Committee, Federal News Service 9 (May 24,2000) ("Every lost sale is a
lost royalty.").
247 See Bell, 76 NC L Rev at 557 (cited in note 78). See generally Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev 281
(cited in note 22) (arguing that some publishers should have sufficient incentives to publish
without copyright).
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B. Digital Distribution and the Irrelevance of Copyright
The Internet and digital technology clearly threaten copyright as
we know it, but are they a threat because they prevent copyright from
accomplishing its purpose? Or is the real threat of Internet file sharing
its potential to eliminate the need for copyright and content distribu-
tors? If the threat is the former, then efforts to expand copyright pro-
tection and prohibit the activities of Napster and similar services are
consistent with Congress's power to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts. However, if the nature of the digital dilemma is
that copyright is no longer needed as a vehicle for distributing content
to the public, then copyright's expansion is inconsistent with the pro-
motion of progress. Instead of viewing Internet file sharing as a threat,
we should consider the possibility that it is the solution to the distribu-
tion problem created by free riding and the public good nature of in-
formation.
While copying content for public distribution in the brick-and-
mortar world of paper, plastic, trucks, and warehouses requires a sig-
nificant investment, in cyberspace, copying and distribution costs are
virtually nonexistent.2 ' s As discussed earlier, the fixed costs are less
than $1,000.U9 Once a work is created, the marginal cost of making an
unlimited number of digital copies and distributing them worldwide is
zero.' Low costs, combined with the ease of distributing and finding
content through Napster and other online technologies, mean that
content is capable of spreading over the Internet like an unstoppable
viral outbreak, ' or, to borrow a phrase from Thomas Jefferson, a "fire,
expandable over all space.''n2 After all, the Internet is a file-sharing
platform, 3 and in 2000 over half the adult population (104 million
adults) and almost three-quarters of children ages twelve to seventeen
in the United States had access to the Internet.' That is the power of
digital technology and the reason content distributors fear the Inter-
248 See Part I.
249 See Part II.
250 See Valenti Warns of the Dangers of Internet Piracy before Congressional Subcommittee
at 9, MPAA press release (Oct 28, 1999), available online at <http:/www.mpaa.orgljack/99/
99_10_28a.htm> (visited Dec 21,2001) (recognizing that the Internet allows "a single pirate with
a single copy of film to produce thousands of copies in a few hours, which are then distributed to
sites all over the world").
251 See Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 2d at 332 (comparing the distribution of unauthorized copies
with an epidemic).
252 Letter from Jefferson to McPherson at 1015 (cited in note 1).
253 See Reno v American Civil Liberties Union, 521 US 844, 850 (1997) (discussing the ori-
gins of the Internet).
254 Associated Press, The Booming Net Population at [ 1-3, Wired News (Feb 18, 2001),
available online at <http:llwww.wired.comlnews/print0,1294,41889,00.html> (visited Dec 21,
2001).
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net.25 But how does this eliminate the need for financial incentives to
distribute information to the public?
The Internet eliminates the need to create financial incentives
because it eliminates the free rider problem of information distribu-
tion. When content is distributed through the Internet, the public in-
ternalizes the costs of distribution. As discussed earlier, copyright ac-
complished this by providing content distributors with exclusive rights
to reproduce and distribute content, which in turn enabled them to
pass on the costs of distribution to the consuming public through
sales. '6
In cyberspace, free riding is eliminated because the public inter-
nalizes the cost of copying and distribution by purchasing the compo-
nents necessary to connect to the Internet-a computer, Internet ac-
cess, storage media, and of course electricity.2 The same products and
services that make it possible for consumers to access the Internet for
e-mail are all that are required to copy and distribute digital content
for one person or millions.2 They are also relatively inexpensive." By
paying for these products and services, consumers in effect purchase
the components that make the copies and form the distribution chan-
nels for disseminating digital content. From the perspective of intellec-
tual property theory, this is revolutionary because content can now be
disseminated to consumers without the need for anyone other than
consumers to invest in distribution.m
255 See Part IVA; Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332 (cited in note 101) (arguing
that as the market for copying expands, the need for copyright increases).
256 See Part IVA; Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 327 (cited in note 101) (noting that
sales of copies must exceed expected costs).
257 See Part I. See also John Borland and Jim Hu, Napster Model Could Make ISPs Subsi-
dize Record Labels at 4, CNET Newscorn (Feb 21, 2001), available online at
<http:llnews.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-4890649.html> (visited Dec 21, 2001) (reporting that use
of peer-to-peer services shifts the cost of distributing music to consumers).
258 See Part I. See Information Infrastructure Task Force, White Paper at 12 (cited in note 2)
(noting that one individual can be a distributor using the Internet).
259 See Part II. See also MPAA, Valenti Warns of the Dangers of Internet Piracy at 10
(cited in note 250) (noting that the equipment for distributing digital content is inexpensive and
highly portable).
260 An argument could be made that this is not so revolutionary because broadcasting
shares similar characteristics with Internet distribution. With broadcasting, consumers internalize
the cost of receiving programming by purchasing televisions or radios. However, the technologies
differ because of the significant market entry barriers to becoming a broadcaster, including the
enormous investment in capital required and the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. See Barry R.
Litman, The Economics of Television Networks, in Alison Alexander, James Owers, and Rod
Carveth, eds, Media Economics: Theory and Practice 131,132-33 (L. Erlbaum Associates 2d ed
1998) (discussing barriers to entry and spectrum scarcity). The two distribution technologies are
also similar because neither depends upon a right to exclude the public from content. In the case
of broadcast, the costs of transmission are funded by the public in the form of public subsidies
and the sale of advertising time.
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Napster illustrates the Internet's ability to distribute content
without the need for copyright. Peer-to-peer platforms such as Nap-
ster allow users to share content stored on the hard drives of other us-
ers. So if a user digitally records songs from a CD onto her hard drive
to listen to them while writing an article or to download them to a
portable player for enjoyment while jogging, once she connects to a
peer-to-peer network, millions of other users can now make copies of
that music for free. Similarly, if a group like the Dave Matthews Band
makes a digital recording of a new song available for downloading on
the Internet, ' millions of copies of that song can be distributed to
consumers through the Internet at no cost to the band.2 As the dis-
trict court in the Napster case recognized, the potential scope of this
technology is breathtaking.2 If the digital music experience is any ex-
ample, copyright is no longer needed for distribution.2
One potential criticism of this argument is that Napster and other
businesses that provide Internet services are simply replacing existing
261 See Phil Gallo, Dave Matthews Makes 'Everyday' Count, Yahoo! News (Mar 17, 2001),
available online at <http://dailynews.yahoo.com/htxnm/200lO307/re/music..sales._dc.6.html>
(visited April 3,2001) (reporting the band's sales of nearly 750,000 copies of its new album in the
first week after distributing a song for free on Napster).
262 Consumers are also not limited to listening to music on their computers, but can transfer
those files to CDs with the purchase of CD burners and blank CDs.
263 Reports also indicate that decentralized peer-to-peer networks like Gnutella have simi-
lar potential to distribute content to millions of consumers. See Borland, P2P Myth at I 21-25,
CNET Newscom (cited in note 4).
264 One study, however, has shown that even peer-to-peer networking may not entirely
avoid the free rider problem. See Eytan Adar and Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on
Gnutella at 23-25, First Monday (Oct 2000), available online at
<http://www.firstmonday.orglissues/issue5_10/adar/index.html> (visited Dec 21, 2001). After
studying file sharing through Gnutella, researchers at Xerox found significant free riding, with
approximately 25 percent of Gnutella users providing 98 percent of the content available, and 1
percent of the users providing 37 percent of the content. Id at 25. According to this study, this
free riding results in a "tragedy of the digital commons," because when only a few users provide
content, the performance of the entire system is slowed due to bandwidth constraints. Id at 39-
41. While this is clearly an important concern, it does not undermine my thesis for two reasons.
First, while free riding may slow the speed of a peer-to-peer network, it does not prevent content
from being distributed-it just affects the speed at which it is distributed. As consumer access to
higher bandwidth continues, technology should minimize if not eliminate the worldwide wait.
Second, peer-to-peer networks like Gnutella are not the only or even the most efficient way for
consumers to share files. Content can just as easily be distributed through web pages, news-
groups, online communities, clubs, chat rooms, and e-mail. Moreover, content can be distributed
more efficiently through centralized services such as those provided by websites, Internet service
providers, and hybrid peer-to-peer networks like Napster that do not suffer from the same
bandwidth constraints. Once maintaining control over copyright is no longer a concern, artists
themselves will likely make works available in order to obtain related financial rewards. As such,
this problem is largely an artifact of the current copyright regime. Gnutella and similar services
are currently considered important alternative means for distribution primarily because it is
more difficult to enforce copyright law against decentralized systems. If I am correct, and copy-
right protection is no longer justified with respect to digital content permitting other avenues of
digital distribution, the free rider problem associated with peer-to-peer networks should become
a minor concern.
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content distributors like the members of the RIAA or the MPAA. 2 If
so, why should Napster or AOL profit from distributing content,
rather than the members of the recording or motion picture industry?
If Napster and Internet service providers ("ISPs") were in the busi-
ness of selling copies of songs to the public, this criticism would be
valid, and arguably allowing Napster to compete with the RIAA
would be unfair even if Napster distributes music more efficiently.26
However, to the extent that this claim is based upon some theory of
contributory or vicarious liability, it is groundless. 7 While Napster may
profit from providing a service that facilitates private copying, like the
photocopying machine and the VCR before it, as long as the underly-
ing conduct of the public is permissible, Napster cannot be subject to
legal sanction.m To the extent that the argument against Napster or an
ISP is based upon a theory of unfair competition or misappropria-
tion, 9 the argument is circular. Holding Napster responsible under ei-
ther theory requires the conclusion that Napster has appropriated
something of value that rightfully belongs to content distributors,
which is precisely the subject of this inquiry. So while there may be
some truth to the claim that Napster and AOL would be replacing
content distributors, the criticism currently has no policy significance
and should have no legal significance.z°
Of course, the content distribution industry recognizes the Inter-
net's ability to shift costs to consumers, and would like to use it for its
own benefit.2' For example, the recording industry clearly intends to
265 See Hardy, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 220 (cited in note 104) (noting that online services sell
access to information).
266 My argument is solely on behalf of noncommercial copying. Even in the absence of
copyright protection, unauthorized commercial copying could be dealt with under principles of
unfair competition. See International News Service v Associated Press, 248 US 215, 235 (1918)
(recognizing a claim for unfair competition even in the absence of a property right in news).
267 See Napster 1, 114 F Supp 2d at 918-22 (analyzing Napster's liability for contributory
and vicarious infringement); A & M Records; Inc v Napster, Inc, 239 F3d 1004,1019-24 (9th Cir
2001) ("Napster I") (same). See also Alfred C Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Sub-
scriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 Georgetown L
J 1833, 1848 (2000) (discussing potential theories of enterprise liability for ISPs, including con-
tributory and vicarious infringement).
268 See Sony, 464 US at 491 (Blackmun dissenting) ("[I]f a significant part of the product's
use is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers cannot be liable for the product's infringing
uses ").
269 See International News Service, 248 US at 236 (noting that "unfair competition in busi-
ness must be determined with particular reference to the character and the circumstances of the
business").
270 Admittedly, there is a fine line between copying and providing a service that facilitates
copying. However, to the extent that we believe that creators of music are entitled to a portion of
the revenues earned by a file-sharing service like Napster, that compensation can be provided
without creating exclusive rights in reproduction and distribution. See Part VI.B.
271 See Borland and Hu, Napster Model Could Make ISPs Subsidize Record Labels at 20,
CNET Newscom (cited in note 257) (reporting that BMG executives were "clearly delighted" by
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enter the digital music market once it eliminates the threat of free file
sharing.m If successful, its profitability will be phenomenal. By distrib-
uting music digitally, the recording industry will eliminate all the costs
associated with making copies and distributing music physically. It will
no longer need raw materials, factories, warehouses, stores, or the per-
sonnel that go with them. As Bertelsmann E-Commerce Group Presi-
dent Andreas Schmidt stated when the Group announced its partner-
ship with Napster, "If we do this, we will have almost no additional
costs but have additional revenues coming in.... [A]ll these delivery
costs, all these distribution costs, go away."'' Instead, consumers will
purchase the computers, Internet connections, and storage media that
are the distribution channels of cyberspace.
Moreover, in addition to the revenues the music industry will re-
ceive from the public directly in the form of licensing fees for the
privilege of downloading music (or in the extreme case the revenue
from charging for each time a song is played), it will receive revenue
indirectly from the public with the sale of each blank CD, tape, digital
recording device, and computer, even if it plays no role in manufactur-
ing or distributing those products.7 The only real expenses it will incur
will be the costs associated with protecting its intellectual property in
the distribution process.2" In the language of economics, the recording
industry will be able to externalize the cost of distributing music while
reaping monopoly profits from every market associated with music. In
the language of Dire Straits, "that ain't working, that's the way you do
it, get your money for nothing...
In light of the distributive power of the Internet, the economics of
digital content distribution bears no relation to the economics of the
brick-and-mortar world. The structure and economics of cyberspace
this cost shifting).
272 See Brian Bergstein, RealNetworks Record Labels Form Subscription Service at 4, AP
(Apr 2, 2001), available online at <http://www.suntimes.com/output/tech/02mus.html> (visited
Jan 15,2002) (reporting a deal between AOL Time Warner, Bertelsmann AG, and EMI Group
with RealNetworks to distribute music on a subscription basis); Ehrlich Testimony at 1% 16-22
(cited in note 146) (discussing the recording industry's intent to enter the digital downloading
market). See also Napster 1, 114 F Supp 2d at 908 (noting that the record company plaintiffs were
preparing to enter the digital download market).
273 Borland and Hu, Napster Model Could Make ISPs Subsidize Record Labels at 22,
CNET News.com (cited in note 257).
274 See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-563,106 Stat 4237, codified at 17
USC §§ 1001-10 (1994) (imposing a royalty payment system on importers, manufacturers, and
distributors of digital audio recording equipment). See also Edmund L. Andrews, Fighting Free
Music, Europeans Take Aim at Personal Computers, NY Times Al (Feb 13,2001) (describing how
European music producers are seeking to impose a tax on computer equipment).
275 See Part VI. One could argue that distributors also incur the costs of marketing. How-
ever, for the purposes of this discussion, marketing is treated as a cost of creation.
276 Dire Straits, Money for Nothing (lyrics), available online at
<http:l/www.letssingit.comllyrics/dldire-straits/6.html> (visited Dec 21,2001).
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promise to end the free rider problem and the market failure associ-
ated with distributing content using the technologies of Gutenberg
and the industrial revolution. Instead, digital technology provides the
promise of a world in which content, once created, flows freely around
the world in a stream of electrons. This is made possible by the fact
that consumers bear the costs of distribution themselves, eliminating
the need for third-party investments in distribution. Accordingly, the
artificial scarcity and exclusive rights created by copyright are not
needed to encourage distribution. When the rights of distributors are
unbundled from the rights of creators, the case for protecting the
rights of distributors cannot be supported. Under these circumstances,
copyright serves no purpose other than to transfer wealth from the
public and, as we shall see, artists to distributors. In this case, the use of
Napster is not theft-copyright is theft.
V. COPYRIGHT AND THE CREATION OF MUSIC
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the economics of digi-
tal technology requires us to separate the incentives for creating and
disseminating content to the public. Once they are unbundled, the jus-
tification for copyright as a means for encouraging distribution disap-
pears, because private goods are no longer needed to disseminate the
public good. We are now able to focus on the more fundamental ques-
tion of whether copyright is justified as a means of encouraging crea-
tion. Assuming, as some have, that in the absence of copyright, all ex-
isting content will eventually migrate onto the Internet, M society
should be concerned with the question of whether new content will be
created. While a CD or book may be a private good that is no longer
necessary, music and poetry still suffer from the problems associated
with being a public good. The following discussion examines the role
and efficacy of copyright in the creation of music. Because the costs
associated with creation vary depending upon the kind of Work, copy-
right may well play a different role with respect to music than it does
with motion pictures or other works2m With regard to music, the exclu-
sive rights created by copyright cannot be justified as a necessary, or
even the most efficient, means of encouraging creation.
A. The Costs of Creating Music
In a digital world, the costs of creation should become the only
costs in making content available to the public, and talent the only
277 Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, Atlantic Monthly at 53 (cited in note 23).
278 See Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 351 (cited in note 22) ("One must know facts about a par-
ticular industry before one can accurately weigh the various costs and benefits associated with
copyright protection.").
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barrier to entry. Unlike brick-and-mortar distribution costs, creation
costs are fixed one-time investments and in general relatively small.
Once a musician records a song, an author types out a manuscript, or a
filmmaker tapes footage, there are no additional costs associated with
creation no matter how many times the content is copied or how far
across the globe it is disseminated. Moreover, while the time and emo-
tional commitment may be significant, the financial investment is rela-
tively small in comparison to that required for global distribution, the
creation of motion pictures being the principal exception.2 By one es-
timate, the typical major-label artist spends $100,000 to $200,000 on
studios, musicians, and other production costs to record an album.20
Advances in technology have reduced the costs of creation as
well. Today, a home computer capable of word processing, editing
video, and recording, sampling, and mixing music can be purchased for
under $900. '' Recording and editing software and hardware can be
purchased for approximately $150.m These elements combined enable
a musician to record music at home with almost the same acoustical
quality as music recorded in a professional studio. Similarly, a com-
petitive professional home recording studio can be built for approxi-
mately $30,000, giving artists even greater flexibility to record their
own music.2' Accordingly, recouping the fixed costs of recording music
may not be as much a concern as the opportunity costs associated with
pursuing a career as an artist rather than as a doctor or an investment
banker.
B. The Irrelevance of Copyright
Unbundling the incentives for the creation and dissemination of
music exposes the myth that copyright plays much of a role in encour-
aging the creation of music. The relative importance of copyright to
creators and distributors is most evident when one considers the fact
that even with copyright protection, the vast majority of musical art-
ists do not earn any income in the form of royalties from the sale of
279 According to the MPAA, the average major studio film in 1999 cost $52 million to pro-
duce. See Valenti, Copyright & Creativity at 2 (cited in note 27).
280 Jon Healey, Breaking Down the Cost of Compact Discs at I 13, SiliconValley.com (Sept
2, 2000), available online at <http://wwwO.mercurycenter.com/svtech/news/indepthdocs/
cd09032000.htm> (visited Dec 26,2001).
281 See, for example, Office Depot's technology catalog, available online at
<http://www.techdepot.com> (visited Dec 21, 2001).
M Eric A. Taub, Homemade Music with a Professional Sound, NY Times Gl1 (Dec 21,
2000) (describing several products that can be purchased for under $150).
283 Id.
284 Bruce Burger, Musicians Find There's No Place Like Home at 10, Elec Engineering
Times (July 5, 2000), available online at <http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20000705SO048>
(visited Dec 21,2001).
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music.2n In fact, not only do musicians rarely earn royalties from the
sale of CDs, they are often in debt to the recording industry for the
costs of manufacturing, marketing, and distributing their music.2 Re-
cording companies typically charge the artist for all the costs of pro-
duction, marketing, promotion, and other expenses, including break-
age-a holdover from when albums were made from vinyl.2 Even in
today's digital world, in which the cost of digital distribution is non-
existent, some record labels have demanded that artists surrender
even larger portions of their royalties for the cost of encoding the
song to digital format, encryption, and digital delivery.m As one report
indicates, an artist must typically sell a million copies of a CD before
she receives any royalties because record companies deduct the costs
of production, marketing, promotion, and other expenses from the
musician's royalties.2 Meanwhile, the same million copies will have
earned the record company approximately $11 million in gross reve-
nue and $4 million net.2Y8 The income to most artists from performance
and mechanical rights for songwriting and composing from the sale of
music are similarly insignificant.91
For example, Roger McGuinn, a songwriter and musician for-
merly with the Byrds, testified before the U.S. Senate regarding his
thirty years of experience as a musician.29 According to McGuinn, who
has recorded over twenty-five albums in his career, "I cannot support
my family on record royalties alone."M For the more than fifteen al-
bums he recorded with the Byrds, in most cases all he received was a
modest advance from Columbia Records. Even a top forty hit during
his solo career did not provide him with any income from album
285 Healey, Breaking Down the Cost of Compact Discs at 16, SiliconValley.com (cited in
note 280) (reporting that "the average recording artist never sees any royalties"); Mann, The
Heavenly Jukebox, Atlantic Monthly at 50 (cited in note 23).
286 Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, Atlantic Monthly at 50-51 (cited in note 23).
287 Healey, Breaking Down the Cost of Compact Discs at 14, SiliconValley.com (cited in
note 280).
2M5 Id (reporting that "some executives at the major labels contend that those costs are
higher than the ones they replace").
289 Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, Atlantic Monthly at 50 (cited in note 23). See also Court-
ney Love, Courtney Love Does the Math, Salon.com (June 14, 2000), available online at
<http:llwww.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14I1ove/print.html> (visited Dec 21, 2001) (discuss-
ing the costs and revenue associated with a record deal, and how a band that obtains a million-
dollar advance and sells one million copies of an album could earn nothing); David Segal, Aspir-
ing Rock Stars Find Major-Label Deals-and Debts, Wash Post Al (May 13, 1995) (discussing
how even successful musicians end up in debt to major record labels).
290 Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, Atlantic Monthly at 50 (cited in note 23).
291 Id.
292 Statement of Roger McGuinn, songwriter/musician, before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary (July 11, 2000), available online at <http://judiciary.senate.gov/7112000_rm.htm>
(visited Nov 20,2001).
293 Id at q 6.
294 Id at q 2.
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sales. 2 Similarly, when he sold approximately five hundred thousand
copies of an album for Arista in 1989, and in 1996 for Hollywood Re-
cords, he received no royalties from album sales."" Instead, McGuinn
makes his living through live performances, with the publicity from
the recordings creating an audience for his live performances.
m
And McGuinn is one of the lucky few musicians who can make a
living as an artist. Given that the average album release is under
twenty-five thousand per CD,2' few musicians are lucky enough to
have a top-forty hit or sell almost half a million albums. According to
the RIAA's own statistics, between 1992 and 1999, less than 1 percent
of audio releases sold a million or more copies.' So while a few elite
artists make money from the sale of music, the vast majority of artists
do not. It should, therefore, be no surprise that with respect to the pri-
vate sharing of digital content, the artists are divided.m In light of the
current state of affairs, free, noncommercial distribution of music
should have little or no impact on the incentives for creating music.
If, as the economic theory of copyright assumes, individuals re-
quire a financial incentive to create, where do artists find this incen-
tive, if not from copy night First of all, it is highly unlikely that aspir-
ing artists think in terms of copyright at all. To the degree that they are
inspired by the financial rewards of becoming a successful artist, they
are dreaming of financial rewards in general, and those financial re-
wards remain even without copyright's exclusive rights to reproduce
and distribute music. As the following demonstrates, musicians can
and do earn significant income by means other than selling copies of
their works.
For most musicians like McGuinn, live performances are the
principal source of income.u As John Perry Barlow, a lyricist for the
295 Id at 4.
296 Id at 15-6.
297 Id at 6.
298 Healey, Breaking Down the Cost of Compact Discs at 15, SiliconValley.com (cited in
note 280) (citing industry estimates).
299 This calculation is based upon an RIAA report that between 1992 and 1999, the re-
cording industry released 241,400 audio recordings, including new and rereleases. See RIAA
Market Data, New Release Figures, available online at <http://www.riaa.com/md-us-6.cfm> (vis-
ited Dee 21,2001). During that same time period, RIAA certified 1,867 records as platinum (that
is, selling at least one million copies).
300 See Napster, Artists Sound Off, available online at <http://www.napster.comlspeakout
artists.html> (quoting artists); RIAA Artists, New Media Issues, Music Online: The Future Is
Now, available online at <http://www.riaa.org/Arists-Issues-l.cfm> (visited Dec 21,2001) (same).
301 Admittedly, some artists may find an incentive in the hope that they too may one day
become one of the few who make money through copyright. See Mike Stoler, Songs That Won't
Be Written, NY T'imes A15 (Oct 7,2000) ("I fear for the 17-year-old songwriter looking forward
to a career in the music business today.").
302 See Barlow, The Economy of Ideas at *8, Wired (cited in note 45) (describing how the
Grateful Dead relied upon live performances, and not copyright, to fund themselves); McGuinn
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Grateful Dead and cyber-commentator, notes, the live experience that
only the actual band can provide has significant commercial value.3
This experience can also be quite lucrative. For example, in March
2001, the Backstreet Boys sold $1,952,674 in tickets for two shows in
Los Angeles, and Matchbox 20 sold $552,275 in tickets for one night in
New York. Elton John sold $772,636 in tickets for one night in De-
cember 2000.0 In 2000 alone, concerts in North America generated
over $1 billion in revenue. ' For the artist, free music is a complemen-
tary good that increases ticket sales.-" According to Barlow, the Grate-
ful Dead "have been letting people tape our concerts since the early
seventies, but instead of reducing the demand for our product, we are
now the largest concert draw in America, a fact that is at least in part
attributable to the popularity generated by those tapes."'' a As a result,
some artists see Napster and file sharing as a way of introducing their
music to new fans in order to promote concert sales.o
Indeed, artists do not limit themselves to exploiting the market
for live performances. Eliminating the exclusive right to reproduce
and distribute music digitally does not mean that all other rights
should be eliminated as well. Artists should still retain the rights to li-
cense derivative works and trademarks, and to endorse products and
services. 30 As a result, popular artists will still be able to earn signifi-
cant income from the licensing and sales of tie-in products such as
Harry Potter dolls, Star Wars figures, and concert T-shirts. They will
continue to receive revenue from endorsements, advertising, and pub-
lic appearances. Likewise, artists should be entitled to licensing reve-
nue from all commercial uses of their works, including broadcasting.
Allowing the public to copy music and other works for personal use
does not mean that others should be free to exploit an artist's work
for profit. As George Lucas demonstrated to the motion picture in-
Testimony at 91 6 (cited in note 292); Testimony of Peter Breinholt, recording artist, before Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary 8-11 (Oct 9, 2000), available online at
<http:/ljudiciary.senate.gov/1092000._pb.htm> (visited Dec 21,2000).
303 Barlow, The Economy of Ideas at *8,Vred (cited in note 45).
304 See <http://www.billboard.comlchartslboxscore.asp> (visited Apr 3,2001).
305 Id.
306 Ray Waddell, Tour Business Should Profit from Big Summer Lineup, 113 Billboard 1
(Mar 17,2001).
307 See Barlow, The Economy of Ideas at *8,1Wired (cited in note 45); McGuinn Testimony
at 6 (cited in note 292); Breinholt Testimony at 8,10 (cited in note 302). Economists define
a complementary good as a product whose fall in "price will cause the quantity demanded for
the other product to rise." Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 49 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
3W Barlow, The Economy ofIdeas at *8, Wired (cited in note 45).
309 Breinholt Testimony at 9 (cited in note 302).
310 See generally Jeffrey Brabee and Todd Brabec, Musiq Money, and Success (Schirmer 2d
ed 2000) (discussing the available sources of income to artists). See also Donald S. Passman, All
You Need to Know about the Music Business (Simon & Schuster 2000) (same).
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dustry, for the artist, these secondary markets can be more lucrative
than the right to reproduce and distribute content .
In addition to these traditional sources of income, the Internet
may facilitate new methods of obtaining income by connecting artists
directly to their audiences. Recently, Stephen King experimented with
what can be described as the ransom model of self-publishing.t King
requested that individuals who download installments of his latest
story pay him $1 per installment (subsequent installments were priced
at $2), but he did not demand or require payment up front.t Instead,
he announced that if he did not receive payments for at least 75 per-
cent of downloads, he would not finish the story.3' To date, as reported
by King's website, he has completed the first book with plans for a
second, and made over $400,000 in profit." What this means for musi-
cians is that they could tease the public with free samples but withhold
releasing a full album, refuse to release any new works, or refuse to go
on tour until sufficient compensation has been received. As it did for
King, the frictionless environment of the Internet should make it eas-
ier for artists to reach their fans to make their pleas or threats."6
A close cousin to the ransom approach is tipping. For example,
Espra and Snarfizilla are file-sharing services like Gnutella or Freenet,
but when users download a specific song, they are given the opportu-
nity to tip the artist whose work they are downloading.3" Despite the
limits of charitable giving and the existence of alternative services that
neither require nor facilitate "tipping," artists are already receiving in-
come from this service.3' While the current income revenue is not sig-
nificant (reportedly, artists such as David Bowie and U2 have received
checks that "are usually less than a hundred" dollars), tipping might
become a source of significant income as these networks expand. First,
Internet tipping functions clearly facilitate voluntary giving by reduc-
ing the transaction costs associated with connecting the public to a
particular artist and by reminding the public of the artist's financial
needs. Additionally, the significance of tipping will most likely grow in
direct relationship to the size of the sharing network. The low level of
311 See generally Howard Maxford, George Lucas Companion (Batsford 1999); Dale Pol-
lock, Skywalking: The Life and Films of George Lucas (Samuel French Trade 1990).
312 David D. Kirkpatrick, Stephen King Sows Dread in Publishers with His Latest E-Tale,
NY Tnes C1 (July 24,2000).
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 See <http://www.stephenking.com> (visited Dec 21,2001).
316 See Cohen, 97 Mich L Rev at 561 (cited in note 119) (describing how the Internet can
help reduce transaction costs).
317 David Kushner, Tipping for Tunes at 1, RollingStone.com (Mar 7, 2001), available
online at <http://www.rollingstone.comlnews/newsarticle.asp?nid=13427> (visited Dec 21,2001).
318 Id.
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tipping illustrated by Snarfizilla may be explained in part by the size
of its user base. In contrast, even if only 1 percent of Napster's regis-
tered users tipped for each download, those tips would amount to half
a million dollars in revenue per song. Depending upon the availability
of a tipping function, voluntary giving could represent a significant
source of revenue for artists.3
The foregoing demonstrates that currently copyright plays a
minimal role, if any, in encouraging the creation of music. The vast ma-
jority of artists do not earn their income from the sale and distribution
of music. Rather, they earn their income from the fame and publicity
that go with the distribution of music. Ticket sales, T-shirt sales, and
commercial endorsements are all a function of an artist's popularity.
By facilitating the distribution of music, Napster and the Internet in
general can be useful tools for increasing an artist's ability to earn
revenue as a result of fame. This is especially beneficial to new or non-
mainstream artists who are otherwise unable to capture the public's
attention through more traditional media."" Given the low transaction
costs associated with the Internet, digital technology also allows for
creative solutions such as ransoming and tipping to increase revenue
to artists without the need for denying the public access to their works.
While some artists may earn more under the current copyright regime
from the sale of physical copies of their works than they would absent
copyright, the evidence that artists require those revenues as incen-
tives to make music is scant at best.
When one recognizes that the Internet and digital technology
eliminate the need for distributors and weaken their stranglehold on
the public, reduce the costs of creation, and reduce the transaction
costs associated with connecting artists to the public, most artists may
in fact be far better off in a world without copyright. Nonetheless, if
one believes that the revenue sources other than the sale of physical
albums create insufficient incentives, a claim that appears to lack any
empirical proof; there is an alternative to copyright.
VI. THE DIGITAL RECORDING ACT
Almost forty years ago, Kenneth Arrow argued that, under eco-
nomic principles, the public's interest in encouraging the creation and
319 Legislation could be enacted to require file-sharing services to include a tipping func-
tion. while this may raise a First Amendment objection with respect to compelled speech, it may,
nonetheless, survive constitutional scrutiny because it is justified by a substantial, if not compel-
ling, governmental purpose in protecting the incentives for creation, and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that purpose.
320 See Amy Harmon, Unknown Musicians Find Payoffs Online, NY Tmes Al (July 20,
2000) (reporting on how Internet exposure benefits unknown artists).
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dissemination of content is best served through government subsidy2'
Public funds could be used to fund creation without denying anyone
access to the work.m In response, Harold Demsetz challenged the idea
that public funding is necessarily superior to a market regime.33 Ac-
cording to Professor Demsetz, a market-based property regime pro-
vides important information regarding consumer preferences that al-
lows artists to channel their investments accordingly. 3 In other words,
without sales, investments in creation would be made inefficiently.
Concerns over public funding can also be seen in Neil Netanel's more
recent evaluation of copyright from the perspective of democratic
self-governance. In addition to signaling consumer preferences, "copy-
right fosters the development of an independent sector for the crea-
tion and dissemination of original expression, a sector composed of
creators and publishers who earn financial support for their activities
by reaching paying audiences rather than depending on state or elite
largess." ' The degree to which the public's preferences may be ma-
nipulated by government subsidy or corporate sponsorship is an im-
portant concern given copyright's democracy-enhancing role.m So
while a private property regime denies access to those who cannot or
will not pay, a public regime makes it difficult to determine what the
public wants and threatens the independence of artists. Once again,
the Internet and digital technology may address both sets of concerns.
A. The Proposal
To the extent that additional financial incentives for the creation
of music are considered necessary, Congress could enact a Digital Re-
cording Act ("DRA"). This Act could fund artists through a scheme
similar to the one enacted by the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
("AHRA").' Congress passed the AHRA in response to industry
concerns that digital audiotapes would undermine the market for
CDs m Among other things, the AHRA imposes a 3 percent statutory
321 Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in Na-
tional Bureau for Economic Research and the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social
Science Research Council, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Economic and Social
Factors: A Conference of the Universities 609, 623 (Princeton 1962).
322 Id.
323 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J L & Econ 1
(1969).
324 Id.
325 Netanel, 106 Yale L J at 347 (cited in note 135).
326 Id.
327 Pub L No 102-563,106 Stat 4237, codified at 17 USC §§ 1001-10 (1994).
328 See HR Rep No 102-873(11), 102d Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1992) ("The music recording indus-
try became concerned that the DAT recorder's 'perfect' copying capabilities could significantly
decrease consumer demand for commercially prerecorded music products because there would
be significantly more illegal 'perfect' copies in circulation.").
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levy on the sales of blank digital audiotapes and a 2 percent levy on
the sale of digital audiotape equipment.9 These funds are then divided
pursuant to a formula among the recording industry, performers, pub-
lishers, and writers?"'
Using a similar model, the DRA could easily provide a source of
revenue for musicians and songwriters instead of copyright. Statutory
levies could be imposed on subscriptions for Internet service and the
sales of computer, audio, and video equipment.33' Germany is consider-
ing imposing a flat fee on all the components of home computers that
can be used in copying (CD burners, hard drives, scanners, and print-
ers).' While this fee would increase the cost of a fully equipped com-
puter by $80, it is estimated that the fee would raise $500 million a
year in Germany alone:33 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in
2000, U.S. computer and software stores made approximately $23 bil-
lion in sales, and radio, television, and electronic stores earned ap-
proximately $42 billion.'3 A 2 percent levy on these sales would yield
approximately $1.3 billion for distribution to artists per year. This
represents the projected revenues for the entire digital downloading
market under copyright in 2002, or roughly $48,000 per new release.3
Furthermore, unlike traditional government subsidy of the arts,
the funds generated under the DRA would not have to be divided
equally or selected by government officials, but could be disbursed
based upon the popularity of works.3  As Senator Orrin Hatch recog-
nized, it is possible to monitor and track the downloading and use of
digital works on the Internet!- Web pages and computer networks can
329 See 17 USC § 1004.
330 Id § 1006(b).
331 Not only do these services contribute to the copying and dissemination of digital music,
they arguably benefit from its popularity. Free music could be considered a complementary good
for these products and services because it increases their sales.
332 Edmund L. Andrews, Fighting Free Music, Europeans Take Aim at Personal Computers,
NY Tunes Al (Feb 13,2001).
333 Id. From the public's perspective, a one-time payment of $80 at every upgrade of a com-
puter is much more affordable than even a modest subscription payment of $10 per month.
334 See US Census Bureau, Monthly Retail Trade Survey (2000), available online at
<http:lwvw.census.gov/mrts/www/data/html/salOO.html> (visited Dec 21, 2001). These figures are
used purely for illustrative purposes, as they are both overinclusive (because they contain the
sales figures for noncomputer equipment) and underinclusive (because they do not contain the
figures for computer sales through other stores or online).
335 See Recording Industry Association of America, The Cost of a CD at 7, available
online at <http://www.riaa.org/md-us-7.cfm> (visited Dec 21, 2001) (estimating that roughly
twenty-seven thousand new releases hit the market per year).
336 Similar proposals were put forward to deal with home video recording that would have
imposed fees on VCRs and blank tapes and distributed the revenues based upon audience rat-
ings. See Bettig, Copyrighting Culture at 167-69 (cited in note 95) (discussing proposals).
337 See Prepared Testimony of Senator Orrin G. Hatch before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary 10 (July 11, 2000), available online at <http:/judiciary.senate.gov/-judiciary/
7112000._ogh.htm> (visited Dec 21,2001) ("Both Emusic and MP3.com can track usage levels to
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be programmed to track user behavior, recording whether a user
downloaded any files and the identity of the files accessed, and can
even be programmed to suggest files that a user might like to access
based upon prior behavior.- Files can also be individually pro-
grammed to "phone home" each time they are used.339 Through this
technology it is possible for artists to evaluate consumer preferences,
and therefore direct their investments, without the need for a private
property regime.
For example, Billboard.com maintains listings of the top
downloads at various websites.3° Napster, AOL, and other networks
could build similar tracking systems of their own. By tracking what
music is being listened to, the funds from the statutory levy could be
disbursed based upon consumer preference, whether defined by the
percentage of downloads, number of downloads, percentage of use, or
any number of formulas. When combined with the power of e-mail,
chat rooms, bulletin boards, and websites to connect artists to their
fans, digital technology promises not only to replace sales as an indica-
tor of consumer preferences, but also to paint a more accurate picture
while providing artists with more income than they currently receive
under copyright. At the same time, no one would be denied access to
the artists' works.
Moreover, in contrast to a pay-per-use regime in which each indi-
vidual's use must be monitored, determining consumer preferences
for the purposes of disbursing funds to artists requires only monitor-
ing of aggregate use. The identity of specific individuals is not neces-
sary for artists to determine whether the public enjoys their works.
Accordingly, such a system should alleviate the privacy concerns
raised by the monitoring and tracking (of what specific individuals
accurately account to the artists for use of their music and pay them accordingly.").
338 See Brad King, Emusic Tracks Napster Naughties at 1 1,Wired (Nov 21,2000), available
online at <http://www.wired.comlnewslbusiness0,1367,40316,00.html> (visited Dec 21, 2001)
(reporting that engineers had developed a system to track and identify infringing material on the
Napster network). See also Information Infrastructure Task Force, White Paper at 183-94 (cited
in note 2) (discussing copyright protection technologies). Compare Samuelson, The Copyright
Grab at IT 19-48,Wired (cited in note 10) (discussing non-technology and technology copyright
protection solutions).
339 See Samuelson, The Copyright Grab at 28 (cited in note 10) (discussing smart tech-
nologies that would allow copyright owners to monitor public copying and use); Chris Oakes,
Word Docs with Ears at I9 2-4, Wired News (Aug 31, 2000), available online at
<http://www.wired.comlnews/technology1,1282,38516,00.html> (visited Dec 21,2001) (reporting
that it is possible to place code in a word processed document or e-mail message that tracks sub-
sequent use of the file by allowing the document to "phone home").
340 See <http:l/www.billboard.comlbillboardlhotweb/index.jsp> (visited Dec 21, 2001) (list-
ing the most popular music downloads at various websites). See also Hepler, Comment, 37 San
Diego L Rev at 1176 n 53 (cited in note 57) (noting that Rolling Stone magazine listed the "Top
10 Pirated Internet Tracks").
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read, listen to, and watch) that would be required in order to imple-
ment the "celestial jukebox.'. 1
B. Copyright Rejoinders
Assuming that the DRA and other sources of revenue provide
sufficient incentives for creation, several important questions remain.
First, what about marketing costs? While these alternative sources
may be sufficient for artists to recoup their costs of recording music
and may provide sufficient incentives to become an artist in the first
place, they may not cover the high costs of marketing. Second,
wouldn't the continued recognition of copyright still benefit the public
because it would provide even more incentives for creation? Lastly,
while this argument may be accurate in an entirely online world, we
currently have a dual system of distribution. Is copyright necessary to
protect offline distribution?
1. Marketing.
By one estimate, a major recording label spends roughly $140,000
to $350,000 per album in marketing, promotion, and tour support.'3
Given the high cost of marketing, one could argue that, in the absence
of copyright, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for an artist to re-
coup the costs of both creating and marketing a work. There are sev-
eral responses to this concern.
First, eliminating the right to control reproduction and dissemina-
tion of music does not eliminate a musician's ability to market her
work. Obviously, to the extent that artists desire marketing, they can
invest accordingly, and the Internet will help. For example, Napster is
in fact a very powerful marketing tool. One artist described peer-to-
peer technology as a "high-tech version" of word of mouth.'" Similarly,
websites like MP3.com can help promote an artist at significantly
lower cost than traditional media marketing.'" The rise of Internet ra-
dio should also help artists reach new fans by increasing the number
of global "stations" tailored to specific consumer tastes.4'
341 See Cohen, 28 Con L Rev at 1003-30 (cited in note 15) (arguing that the First Amend-
ment guarantees a right to read anonymously).
342 Healey, Industry Seeks to Justify Huge Overhead on the Price of Compact Discs at 3
(cited in note 280).
343 Breinholt Testimony at 9 (cited in note 302).
344 Id.
345 See World Beat, Research Shows Web Radio Can Succeed: 21 Stations Attract Respectable
Numbers at 4, Nyrock.com (Apr 5, 2001), available online at
<http:lwww.nyrock.comlworldbeatlO4 2001/040501.asp> (visited Dec 21, 2001) (reporting that
Internet radio allows programmers to aggregate geographically splintered listening audiences
who prefer similar genres); Associated Press, Bowie Sees Velvet Goldmine in Net Radio at 2,
CNET Newscom (Apr 4,2001) (reporting that musician David Bowie will launch his own Inter-
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Recently, the rock band Smashing Pumpkins demonstrated the
power of the Internet to distribute music without traditional market-
ing when they released their final album.' With the exception of
twenty-five vinyl copies of the album, the twenty-five song album was
released for free exclusively in MP3 format.4 The Drudge Report and
MTV originally reported the release, and the news then spread
through message boards on the Smashing Pumpkins website and fan
sites.' 4 Once released, the songs spread across the Internet, with unaf-
filiated websites "hosting" the songs and people sharing them over
Napster and other services.49
Second, in many respects the argument that copyright should be
used to subsidize marketing is the exact opposite of the consumer
preference argument and should be rejected for the same reasons that
the consumer preference argument must be addressed. While market-
ing admittedly provides consumers with important information such
as the availability of a new album or artist,3'0 it allows wealth to distort,
rather than reflect, the market.35 Under these circumstances, copyright
as a means for recouping marketing costs is inconsistent with the eco-
nomic and democratic justifications for copyright. To the degree that
this means that the ability of major recording labels and already suc-
net radio service), available online at <http://newsbbc.co.uk/hi/english/entertainment/music/
newsidl260000/1260747.stm> (visited Dec 21,2001); Eve Epstein, Online Radio Hits Its Stride at
1 5, CNN.com (May 23, 2000), available online at <http://www.cnn.com/2000frECH
/computinglO5/231web.radio.idglindex.html> (visited Dec 21, 2001) (reporting how online radio,
which is estimated to yield advertising revenues of $12 billion to $22 billion by 2005, allows users
to tailor their own content).
346 Cecily Barnes, The Smashing Pumpkins Take Music Directly to Napster Fans, CNET
News.com (Sept 12, 2000), available online at <http:I/news.cnet.comlnewslO-1005-200-




350 Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act:A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 Va L Rev 1, 8 (1992) ("Advertising contrib-
utes to consumer welfare by providing information.").
351 As it is currently structured, the major recording companies routinely manipulate what
the public hears by paying radio stations to play their music. See Douglas Abell, Pay-for-Play, 2
Vand J Enter L & Prac 52,52 (2000) (discussing how the recording industry compensates broad-
casting stations for playing their songs); Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, Atlantic Monthly at 53
(cited in note 23) (noting that five companies control approximately 85 percent of the market for
recorded music in the United States, in part because of their marketing muscle). See also Terence
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Mifflin 4th ed 1985) (arguing that advertising manipulates demand). But see BeVier, 78 Va L
Rev at 4-8 (cited in note 350) (arguing that advertising is economically efficient).
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cessful artists to promote works will be limited because consumers
prefer other works, so be it. Copyright exists to protect creation, not to
increase any individual creator's chances of being accepted in the
marketplacen The government's ability to restrict the market-
distorting effects of money may be limited,.35 but the government
should not recognize property rights for the sole purpose of creating
or amplifying those distortions?'"
2. Exclusive rights maximize incentives.
As the preceding demonstrates, the financial incentives created
by copyright are no longer needed for the creation of works and their
dissemination to the public. The Internet and digital technology not
only make it possible for the public to internalize the costs of distribu-
tion, but they may also help level the playing field for artists by reduc-
ing the market distortions created by compensation schemes based
predominantly upon the sale of hard copies. Nonetheless, while copy-
right may not be necessary, can it still be useful? In other words, will it
do any harm to continue to recognize copyright? The continued rec-
ognition of copyright's exclusive rights is not only unnecessary, but
also detrimental to society. As Professor Stewart Sterk reminds us,
"Copyright protection has serious costs."
335
Initially, the pessimist critiques of copyright's expansion are now
even more compelling, because the countervailing interests in content
creation and distribution no longer exist. In a pre-digital world, while
one may have justified restricting access to works even for scholarly or
expressive purposes because copyright protection could be viewed as
an equal engine for free expression,.3 that argument is no longer accu-
rate. There are no substantial, let alone compelling, governmental in-
terests to justify restricting public access to works when access is
sought for important or compelling purposes. Consequently, the dis-
trict court's conclusion in Reimerdes that the DMCA's restrictions
352 See Litman, 39 Emory L J at 969 (cited in note 94) ("Nurturing authorship is not neces-
sarily the same thing as nurturing authors."). Similar sentiments are found in antitrust law, which
protects "competition, not competitors," Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294,320 (1962),
and in Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which "protects the interstate market, not par-
ticular interstate firms," Exxon Corp v Maryland, 437 US 117,127 (1978).
353 See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 748,
759-61 (1976) (recognizing commercial speech as protected First Amendment expression); Buck-
ley v Valeo, 424 US 1,143 (1976) (striking down limitations on campaign expenditures). See also
Netanel, 53 Vand L Rev at 1928 (cited in note 240) (arguing that copyright fosters speech hierar-
chy and should include a reinvigorated fair use doctrine).
354 In the past, this may have been justified because distribution costs were high, but as pre-
viously discussed, that justification no longer exists. See Part IV.
355 Sterk, 94 Mich L Rev at 1209 (cited in note 214).
356 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539,558 (1985) ("The Fram-
ers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.").
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upon expression are justified by the need to protect "copyrighted
works stored in digital media' 37 is simply wrong.
Moreover, the continued recognition of copyright is subject to in-
ternal criticism under the very same economic theory used to justify
its expansion. In a world in which the public internalizes the cost of
distribution and funds creation, and no one is denied access to music,
copyright unnecessarily distorts the market for music. Economists
recognize that copyright protection involves a tradeoff between pro-
viding incentives for creation and access to the work.3'8 Even under
circumstances in which copyright is considered desirable, economists
have recognized that the optimal level of protection must "be set be-
low the level that maximizes the number of works created."3"9 Other-
wise, the marginal value of creating additional incentives by expand-
ing copyright protection is outweighed by the higher costs of expres-
sion for works that would have been created without the additional
protection and the resulting "greater administrative and enforcement
costs." 3" These resulting costs are objectionable because: (1) the mo-
nopoly power created by copyright unnecessarily restricts access to a
work, and (2) it potentially strips resources from other areas of the
economy.
As noted by Professor Fisher, "Granting an artist or inventor a
property right in his creation may make him a monopolist, giving rise
to familiar economic distortions."' ' First, granting copyright holders
exclusive rights to content insulates them from price competition be-
cause competing works are imperfect substitutes.m This allows the
copyright holder to reap monopoly profits for a work by charging a
price substantially higher than her marginal costs.3 As a result, some
consumers who would otherwise have valued the work at more than
its marginal cost but are unable or unwilling to pay the monopolistic
price will not purchase the work, resulting in a "deadweight loss" to
357 Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 2d at 330.
358 See Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 485 (cited in note 129) (discussing the incentive-access
tradeoff); Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 326 (cited in note 101) ("Copyright protec-
tion... trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incen-
tives to create the work in the first place.").
359 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 343 (cited in note 101). See also Sterk, 94 Mich L
Rev at 1209 (cited in note 214) ("Indeed, from an efficiency standpoint, the optimal copyright
system would not seek to maximize the number of works created but, in recognition of the costs
of copyright, would withdraw protection even when marginally more protection would result in a
marginal increase in creative activity.").
360 See Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 343 (cited in note 101).
361 Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev at 1700 (cited in note 95).
362 See Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 497 (cited in note 129); Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev at 1700-02
(cited in note 95).
363 Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 497 (cited in note 129).
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society.' This problem is exacerbated by the economics of digital
technology. Given that the costs of creation and distribution are al-
ready borne by the public without the need for a property right, any
price a copyright holder demands for a digital work represents mo-
nopoly profits. Even if the price is exceptionally low, some members of
the public will be denied access because they are unwilling to pay. This
in turn may reduce future creation.36
This monopoly power also results in a transfer of wealth from the
consumer to the copyright holder. As a result of the copyright holder's
ability to reap monopoly profits, money that would have otherwise
remained in the pockets of the consumer will now go into the pocket
of the copyright holder.' While some do not view this wealth transfer
as a significant concern,. it can be considered problematic under eco-
nomic theory for several reasons.m First, the wealth transfer may lead
the monopolist to expend more resources politically to maintain the
monopoly.3m From society's viewpoint, these resources are largely
wasted, the same way that theft encourages "an expenditure of re-
sources on thieving and on preventing theft."' ' 7 In the language of pub-
lie choice theory, as Robert Merges and Glenn Reynolds recognize,
"political parasites are a double danger: they not only pursue their
own self-interested agenda, but also force others into a political 'arms
race' to protect their own interests .... And, of course, efforts aimed at
political redistribution of wealth make society poorer, not richer.' ' 7'
In addition to the potential political arms race, copy protection
for digital content necessitates an expensive technological arms race
as well. Given the difficulty of protecting digital works from copying,
copyright holders will be forced constantly to spend significant re-
sources developing technology just to keep the cat in the bag.m These
costs will in turn be passed on to the public, not to provide the public
with access to new works, but for the sole purpose of limiting access.
364 Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev at 1702 (cited in note 95). See also Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at
497-98 (cited in note 129).
365 See Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 343 (cited in note 101). See also Lunney, 49
Vand L Rev at 495-97 (cited in note 129).
366 Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 497 (cited in note 129); Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev at 1701-02
(cited in note 95).
367 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 302 (cited in note 307) (consider-
ing "the transfer of wealth from consumers to producers brought about by increasing the price
from the competitive to the monopoly level ... as a wash").
363 Outside economics, this may be criticized as an unjustifiable transfer of wealth-
specifically, as a taking, class legislation, or capture.
369 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 304 (cited in note 307).
370 Id.
371 Merges and Reynolds, 37 Harv J on Legis at 55 (cited in note 151).
372 See Ehrlich Testimony at J 16 (cited in note 146) (discussing how encryption and other
technological measures are now important costs in distributing music).
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Given that hackers appear to be as adept, if not more so, at picking
the locks of copyright protection as those trying to lock up digital
works, the costs associated with a copy protection arms race would be
unending.3
Similarly, copyright holders would be forced to spend significant
resources prosecuting acts of infringement and those persons who as-
sist in those acts. The RIAA's scorched-earth policy with respect to
digital technology is a clear example of the enforcement costs associ-
ated with maintaining and administering a copyright regime in the
digital age. These costs will only increase as Gnutella and other decen-
tralized peer-to-peer networks rise to replace centralized services like
Napster, or the services move outside the United States. Under these
circumstances, copyright would not exist because of its instrumental
value in encouraging creation, but solely to protect copyright holders.
The monopoly power created by copyright may also reduce the
copyright holder's incentives to innovate.37 Because the monopolist
has already "appropriated much of the consumer surplus," what does
she have to gain from innovating, and what does she have to lose from
not innovating?' In other words, if a musician writes a wildly success-
ful song, and copyright's exclusive rights allow her to earn monopoly
profits, it may no longer be important for her to write new songs.
Finally, by making investments in music more desirable than
other investments, copyright protection will divert funds and invest-
316ments from other uses of society's resources. As Professor Lunneynotes:
[T]he potential for lost access is not the only cost broadening
copyright entails. If we broaden copyright, we increase the eco-
nomic return on any given authorship investment. We can
thereby lure resources, in the form of labor and capital, away
from other productive endeavors into the production of copy-
righted works and lead the market to produce additional works.
But to create these additional works, we must strip the resources
from other sectors of the economy.37
In light of these concerns, Professor Lunney argues that copyright
should not be used to provide artists with the full value associated
with their works.m If copyright were to guarantee individuals the full
373 See also Hardy, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 251 (cited in note 104) (noting the wastefulness of
technological arms races).
374 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 304 (cited in note 307).
375 Id.
376 Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 655 (cited in note 129).
377 Id at 487-88.
378 Id at 654.
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value of their works, it would discourage investments in every other
sector of the economy because in those sectors, individuals generally
recover the cost of creating a new product and not the full value.m In
other words, copyright should place the financial incentives to become
a musician on a level playing field with other careers; it should not
create asymmetrical incentives."
In the past, these costs were considered inevitable byproducts of
a system designed to promote the creation and dissemination of works
and were considered acceptable at certain levels. Given that the Inter-
net and digital technology make it possible for the public to fund the
creation and dissemination of digital works without any loss in the
ability of the market to determine consumer preferences, the costs of
continuing to recognize copyright are simply not worth any increase in
incentives."' As the British historian Thomas Macaulay argued, "Copy-
right is monopoly, and produces all the effects which the general voice
of mankind attributes to monopoly.... [T]he effect of monopoly gen-
erally is to make articles scarce, to make them dear, and to make them
bad. ''m As such, it "ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for
the purpose of securing-the good." Accordingly, in the digital era,
copyright's exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute works are no
longer necessary to secure the public good, and may in fact be incon-
sistent with the public good.
3. Copyright is necessary in a dual distribution system.
Another potential criticism of my argument is that while it may
be appropriate for a world in which all works are distributed online,
we currently live in a world in which distribution occurs both online
and offline. Under this dual distribution system, copyright protection
may be considered necessary for both in order to protect the incen-
fives for offline distribution. To the extent that this criticism assumes
that offline distribution serves important societal interests, such as
providing access to creative works to people who might not have or
are unable to afford computer equipment, it merits consideration. It
379 Id. See also Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 285-86 (cited in note 22):
[Flew workers receive salaries that approach the total value of what they produce.... In-
deed, when a worker without competition-perhaps because he is the only doctor in the
area ... -could charge a price close to the total value of his services to the buyer, we nor-
mally encourage competition, which will force him to charge less.
380 See Lunney, 49 Vand L Rev at 654 (cited in note 129).
381 If the revenues provided from other avenues are insufficient to sustain creation, Con-
gress could either enact the DRA or increase the rate.
382 Thomas Babington Macaulay, First Speech on Copyright, in Edwin L. Miller, ed, Macau-
lay's Speeches on Copyright, and Lincoln's Address at Cooper Union 17, 22 (Houghton Mifflin
1913).
383 Id at 23.
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suggests that we must seriously examine whether such interests exist.
For example, in order to preserve the benefits of free television pro-
gramming, Congress imposed certain restrictions upon cable opera-
tors.3 However, in upholding these restrictions, the Supreme Court
required Congress to demonstrate that the threat to free television
programming was real.3
Otherwise, if the argument is that copyright is necessary because
some people may simply prefer offline distribution, this preference is
not threatened by my proposal. My argument is technology-neutral.
Because commercial copying is still prohibited, distributors of CDs
should still have sufficient incentives to distribute CDs as long as the
public demands them. The choice to migrate toward online music is
left to the public. In the absence of some specific societal need, impos-
ing a regime of exclusive copying and reproduction rights on online
distribution is an argument for preserving the monopoly of offline dis-
tribution by fiat without any corresponding public benefit.
CONCLUSION
Throughout history, technology has expanded humanity's ability
to communicate, to improve ourselves through art and knowledge, and
to pass on what we have learned. Unfortunately, we have not always
understood how to respond to technology's advances. Copyright's ori-
gins as a tool for censorship and monopoly for the writers' guilds in
response to the invention of the printing press should be a cautionary
tale as we attempt to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts in a digital world. To the extent that this endeavor is fraught with
dangers, as Ithiel de Sola Pool observed, "the danger is not of an elec-
tronic nightmare, but of human error. It is not computers but policy
that threatens freedom."' 6 With respect to today's digital copyright
debate, our error is in entering the debate with the familiar assump-
tions of the old world rather than attempting to understand the new.
Copyright developed as a response to the economics of Guten-
berg's printing press, under which works of literature, music, and mul-
timedia are delivered in the form of books, CDs, and videos. In the ab-
sence of legal protections against copying, this method for distribution
was particularly susceptible to free riding by subsequent copiers. In
contrast, today's technology allows us to distribute those same works
as ".docs," ".mp3s," and ".mpgs" at virtually no cost. Freed from the
384 See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v FCC, 512 US 622,623-34 (1994) (noting the re-
strictions placed on cable providers to preserve the benefits of free broadcasting).
385 Id at 664-65 (concluding that "Congress must demonstrate that the recited harms are
real, not merely conjectural," and that "the economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine
jeopardy and in need of the protections afforded by must-carry").
386 Pool, Technologies of Freedom at 226 (cited in note 88).
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economics of the industrial revolution, and connected by the web of
the Internet, the technologies of the information revolution eliminate
the potential for free riding because, to the extent that there are costs
associated with distribution, the public internalizes them. These same
technologies also make it possible to fund creation without denying
anyone access to works. As this Article demonstrates, the new eco-
nomics of digital technology promises to revolutionize the ways in
which we encourage the creation and dissemination of human expres-
sion. It promises a world in which no one is excluded from creations of
the mind because he is unwilling or unable to pay. At the same time, it
has the potential to encourage the growth of an independent and di-
verse community of artists who are directly connected to the public. It
promises all these things without the need or the costs of making ex-
pression something that it is not-property.
Examining the controversy over copyright and digital music is
only the beginning. The lessons learned from digital music should ap-
ply to other creative endeavors. The critical question for these other
endeavors, however, is not whether exclusive rights to reproduce or
distribute creative works are necessary, but whether some version of
the DRA is necessary to support creation. Arguably, the creation of
television programming and motion pictures, like music, may not re-
quire additional funding, because it is already adequately funded
through advertising revenue, programming subscriptions, and box of-
fice ticket sales. In contrast, authors and computer programmers may
require some form of DRA to provide incentives for creation because
they lack such alternate sources of funding. Of course, the exact re-
sponse to the creative destruction of copyright for these other creative
endeavors deserves further attention.
The creative destruction of copyright also raises questions about
the constitutionality of efforts to preserve copyright in cyberspace if
copyright's underlying justifications no longer exist. I suggest that if
technology has changed the economics of information creation and
dissemination, the Intellectual Property Clause's primary role in the
digital era should be to protect individual liberty by delineating the
limits of congressional and state power to restrict access to digital
works. ' The expansion of copyright's monopoly into the new tech-
387 See Merges and Reynolds, 37 Harv J on Legis at 64 (cited in note 151) (arguing that the
Intellectual Property Clause imposes internal limits upon Congress). Compare with the general
discussions in Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judi-
cial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 Berkeley Tech L J
535 (2000) (arguing that the Intellectual Property Clause limits government's ability to create
exclusive rights); Paul J. Heald and Suzanna Sherry, Implied Constitutional Limits on Congres-
sional Power: Construing the Commerce Power in Light of the Intellectual Property Clause, 2000
U Ill L Rev 1119 (same); Theodore H. Davis, Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Ra-
tional Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 Minn L Rev 595,640 (1996) (same); David L. Lange,
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nologies of the Internet when its underlying justification no longer ex-
ists would hardly be consistent with Congress's power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' ' .
Other problems must also be addressed. In a world in which non-
commercial copying is permitted, what are the limits of commercial
copying? How will we define unfair competition in the digital age? Fi-
nally, we must address the digital divide." If the Internet is to be the
new medium for distributing content, we must take steps to ensure
that everyone is connected regardless of race, nationality, or socioeco-
nomic status.
There will of course be opposition to this vision. Just as Guten-
berg's printing press threatened the dominance of scribes, peer-to-
peer networking and MP3s clearly threaten the recording industry,
whose business depends upon manufacturing and distributing old bot-
tles. While we should be concerned about their plight, we must be
careful to identify whose interests are being served by copyright's ex-
pansion. Keeping in mind that the digital world will be what we want
it to be, we must ask ourselves, will we program it for the benefit of a
few, or will we program it for the good of all?
The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law:An Appreciation of Two Re-
cent Essays and Some Thoughts about Why We Ought to Care, 59 Law & Contemp Probs 213
(1996) (same); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability: The Intersection of the Intellectual
Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Sil-
star Corp., 18 Seattle U L Rev 259 (1995) (same).
3M5 US Const Art I, §8, cl 8.
389 See generally National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Falling
through the Net: Defining the Digital Divide (US Department of Commerce Nov 1999), available
online at <http:llwww.ntia.doc.govlntiahome/digitaldivide/> (visited Dec 21,2001).
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